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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

December 4, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

9/15/01
7/10/01
6/1/01
5/1/01
5/1/01
5/1/01
5/1/01
5/1/01

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning Soviet Defections, ZF010285W. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the Army-originated information no longer warrants classification protection and is partially releasable to you. The records are enclosed for your use. Fees for processing this request are waived.

Since the release of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy rights of the individuals concerned this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code (b)(6).

In addition, since the release of the information in the records would reveal the identity of confidential sources, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. 2FO10285W

As of 23 Aug 79 all material included
(Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Estelle Moulden OS-23-79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

ESTELLE MOULDEN GS-5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 10/2/79

1

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

4343
W

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CO HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO:

CO, 430TH CIC DET, USFA

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

Col. J. J. Kelly III by *VW*

INFO:

on 19 AUG 1958

DATE-TIME GROUP

6 1400 Nov 1952

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

FOR:

ROUTINE

☐

BOOK MESSAGE

☐

ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐

MULTIPLE ADDRESS

CRYPTOPRECAUTION

☐

YES

☐

NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CMM AUSTRIA PD HE OUR FOX NR EIGHT EIGHT EIGHT THREE DTD FIVE NOV CURR CMM REQUEST YOUR COPY OF REFERENCED MSG BE DOWNGRADED FROM TOP SECRET TO SECRET CLASSIFICATION AND THIS DET NOTIFIED WHEN ACTION COMPLETED PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEX

M/R: SUBJ reportedly is a Soviet Air Force Col, who was originally reported willing to defect to the West. Subsequent info indicated that this was wishful thinking on the part of SUBJ's girl friend, who believes she can induce SUBJ to defect. 430th CIC Det has agreed to allow Reg IV to control case, and an effort will be made to accomplish SUBJ's desertion if feasible.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON

OCT 14 1997

BY

CDR USAINSCOM/FOIP

Auth

Para 1.603 DoD 5200.14

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult Cryptocenter Before Declassifying

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 380-320-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, source, or even the existence of such confidential sources information is prohibited in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information. It is to be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or a higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to be a violation of AR 380-10.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET INFORMATION

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

EUGENE L. MAILADY, MAJ, TC

OFFICIAL TITLE

Chief, Operations Section

RELEASING OFFICER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

M. L. RISSINGER, DAC/jf

SYMBOL

D-278482

TELEPHONE

283

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES FORM 173, 1 MAY 49 WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-52-500M-27M

4337

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

7-8903

0610487

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: (Originator)

CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO: CO, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

Col. J. May Jr. J.W.

INFO: on 19 AUG 1958

DATE-TIME GROUP 6 1015 Nov 52		INFORMATION	
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION ROUTINE		
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE		
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
IDENTIFICATION D-2599		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	

SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN AUSTRIA PD DESIRE UR MSG DOG DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE DTD TWO NINE OCT CURR AND OUR MSG FOX DASH EIGHT EIGHT SIX FIVE DTD ONE THREE OCT CURR BE DOWNGRADED FROM TOP SECRET TO SECRET CLASSIFICATION PD THIS CORRESPONDENCE SERVES AS AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION PD REUR DOG DASH TWO FIVE NINE NINE DTD FIVE NOV CURR WHAT ARE UR PLANS FOR FUTURE ACTION RE SUBJ QUERY WHEN CMM WHERE AND BY WHOM WILL AUSTRIAN SINGER BE MET QUERY PERTINENT POINTS LISTED IN OUR FOX DASH EIGHT EIGHT SIX FIVE STILL IN EFFECT PD EVAL OF SOURCES AND INFO DESIRED IN FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE PD WHAT ACTION CMM IF ANY CMM IS FOUR THREE ZERO CON-TEMPLATING RE THIS CASE QUERY DESIRE THIS HQ BE INFORMED EXPEDITIOUSLY ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TORME

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult Cryptocenter before declassifying

M/R: D-2599 dtd 5 Nov 52 from Reg IV pertains to case of SUBJ, however, sources and sub-sources may have exaggerated story. 430th CIC (Maj ALDRICH) briefed 4 Nov curr as to reason for contacting their source. Identity of SUBJ and Austrian singer unknown at this time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 380-320-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, sources, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered an offense under AR 300-5.

Author's NAME (and signature, when required)
M.L. RISSINGER
M. L. RISSINGER, DAC/JT

OCT 14 1958
CDR USARSCUMHEDS
Para 1.603 D-2599

SYMBOL
D-278482

TELEPHONE
283

SECURITY INFORMATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
RELEASING OFFICIAL'S SIGNATURE <i>EUGENE J. KILPATRICK</i>	
OFFICIAL TITLE Senior, Operations Section	

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES WME FORM 173, 1 MAY 49 WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-52-500M-27805

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

ROUTING

10
1-8883

051440

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO: CO, HQ 430th CIC DET, SALZBURG

REGRADED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY AUTHORITY OF

COL *Laurence C. Phillips*
BY *Laurence C. Phillips* ORDC

INFO: ON 2d 14 25 Feb 56

DATE-TIME GROUP

5 0900 Nov 1952

PRECEDENCE FOR:

ROUTINE

☐ BOOK MESSAGE

☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS

CRYPTOPRECAUTION

☐ YES

☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJ SOV AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CMM AUSTRIA PD CONFIRMING CONVERSATION BAINWOL SLASH ALDRICH FOUR NOV CURR DEFECTION OF SUBJ VIEWED WITH GREATEST INTEREST THIS HQ CMM PARTICULARLY IF DELIVERY OF MIG CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PLUS HIS KNOWLEDGE SOVIET AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES ETC AND TYPES DOCUMENTS HE MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN PD OBOE SUGAR ITEM NOT RPT NOT NOTIFIED PENDING RESULTS MEETING WITH SUBJ'S MISTRESS CMM STATUS AND MODE OF TRAVEL OF SUBJ ASCERTAINED PD ITEM DOG USAREUR INDIRECTLY NOTIFIED RE SUBJ PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult
Cryptocenter before declassifying

M/R: Coordinated with Majors MALEADY, ROSE, GALLAGHER, and SULLIVAN
29 Oct 52.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USARNSCOM FOIPD
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.2-R

6390

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 560-200-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, source, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to be a violation of AR 560-5.

Page 1 of 1 Pages
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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

NAME (and signature, when required)

M. L. RISSINGER, DAC/jf

TELEPHONE
283

OFFICIAL TITLE
Chief, Operations Section

SYMBOL
D-278482

DD FORM 173
1 OCT 49

REPLACES WME FORM 103, 1 MAY 49
WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-52-500M-2780

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

INCOMING MESSAGE

CORE CLERK: ALLEN
MSG SVCD: YES ☒ NO

FROM: ROEMMER, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

TOO: 051240Z NOV 52

FOR ACTION: RISSINGER, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TOR: 051346Z NOV 52

FOR INFO:

REFERENCE NR: D-2599

PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

URMSG F-8865. SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COLONEL, BADEN AUSTRIA. INTERROGATION SOURCE OF SOURCE O-0123IV IN SALZBURG AUSTRIA ON 4 NOV CURR DISCLOSED INFO CONCERNING SUBJ ORIGINATED WITH A PERSON EMPLOYED CAPACITY CASUAL SOURCE BY 430 CIC. EARLIEST INTERROGATION POSSIBLE OF 430 CIC SOURCE AT 2100 HOURS 4 NOV CURR DISCLOSED HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH AN AUSTRIAN NATIONAL FEMALE SINGER, RESIDENT OF BADEN, AUSTRIA WHO FOR PAST TWO YEARS HAD BEEN DATING A SOVIET AIR FORCE OFFICER STATIONED AT BADEN NEAR VIENNA. RANK OF OFFICER UNKNOWN TO SOURCE STATED IT TO BE BETWEEN MAJ AND COLONEL. 430 CIC SOURCE STATED TRUE STORY AS GIVEN BY SINGER IS NOT THAT SOVIET OFFICER WAS WILLING TO DESERT BUT THAT SHE BELIEVED HE WOULD DESERT IF SHE FORCED ISSUE. SOURCE WOULD NOT DIVULGE IDENTITY OF SINGER. AGREED TO CONTACT SINGER AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH REGION IV AGENTS. ALL PREVIOUS INFO AS REPORTED BY SOURCES NOW KNOWN TO REGION IV TO HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED. MAJ ALDRICH BRIEFED AS TO REASON FOR CONTACTING THEIR SOURCE. AGREED THAT REGION IV SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF CASE. REGION IV AGENTS WILL PURSUE CASE AGGRESSIVELY COMMENSURATE WITH CURR CASE COMMITMENTS. HIGHER CLASSIFICATION OF THIS MSG BELIEVED NOT WARRANTED.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

D-278482

Twx to Region IV

19 AUG 1958
ON 6 NOV 52

REGRADUATED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 17 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FORPS
Auth Para 1.503 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : FILE (MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD) DATE: 4 November 1952

FROM : RISSINGER *W. J. Rissinger*

SUBJECT: Soviet Air Force Colonel *on 19 AUG 1958*

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

Captain ROEMER from CIC Region IV called and stated that matters have been complicated re SUBJECT since the sub-source and contact of ~~2-123~~ 0-123-IV is an employee (leg man) of the 430th CIC. S/A BAINWOL is in SALZBURG and could be reached thru telephone LD-30, SALZBURG. Matter discussed with Major ROSE and since we are dependent on the 430th CIC it was decided that this case would be coordinated with Major ALDRICH, Operations Officer, 430th CIC Det. only. BAINWOL will meet his contact at 1400 hours this date in SALZBURG and then will ~~xxxxxx~~ brief Major ALDRICH.

who is employed by the 430th
It is unknown whether the sub-source has mentioned anything to his employer, however, assistance to this point has been received from the 430th and additional aid will be required if the operation is to be successful.

Numerous complications such as Austrian license plates, telegrams, telephone calls and others have been encountered, and therefore it ~~is~~ felt that Major ALDRICH SHOULD be apprised of the limited information we have re SUBJECT.

S/A BAINWOL called from SALZBURG and discussed the situation and need for coordination with the 430th CIC. BAINWOL was instructed to call Major ALDRICH and to brief him ~~if~~ he has ~~not~~ met the sub-source.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ 6

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997

BY CDR USN/SCM F01P3

Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File D-27848

MEMO TO MAJOR ROSE:

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of

19 AUG 1958

Attached is the correspondence which I have received and sent

date regarding the Soviet Colonel in BADEN, Austria. I hesitate to call the 430th CIC Detachment in on this one until we definitely know that he can not come out with the MIG.. Major Gallagher ^{PI section} agrees with me too inasmuch as they gobbled one re the two Czech motorcyclists who came to SALZBURG and as far as we know ~~WERE~~ ripe for defection.

I submit the following comments for consideration in the event that this case materializes:

a) If the Colonel can bring a MIG out, then notify the US Air Force, to give all assistance necessary even to the point of sending an escort to the British Zone of Austria. This will require coordination with the Air Force, ID ESAREUR, and with the British. The distance from BADEN, Austria to the British Zone ^{Austria} is less than 100 kilometers which means that in 10 minutes or less he could be Allied territory, should he run out of gasoline.

b) If he cannot bring a MIG out, suggest some consideration then be given for coordination with the 430th CIC and with the US Air Forces. I'm sure that the Air Forces would be glad to send a plane to VIENNA and bring him out with bag and baggage.

c) I've called Captain ROEMER in Region IV and he promised to keep us informed as soon as he has any new information.

d) I've double checked talked to Major SULLIVAN in ID ^{by telephone} and off the record kept him apprised of what we intended and hoped to do. He promised not to get the brass excited until we ^{decided to} have the MIG and the body. *good!*

e) I've informed MALEADY that if this case produces, my opinion of the Mr. PRIBRAM and his activities ^{are} definitely true.

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL JOINT MESSAGE FORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

30/10232

ROUTING

FROM: (Originator)

CO, HQ 66th CIC DET, USAREUR
MR RISSINGER

DATE-TIME GROUP

300845 Oct 52

PRECEDENCE FOR:

ACTION

PRIORITY

☐ BOOK MESSAGE

☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS

CRYPTOPRECAUTION

☒ YES

☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION

D-2583

CLASSIFICATION

Secret

TO:

CO, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of

Col. J. Clayton, Jr., USA, Consular

on 4 9 AUG 1958

INFO:

SUBJ SOV AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CMM AUSTRIA PD URMMSG DOG DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE
DTD TWO NINE OCT CURR VIEWED WITH GREATEST INTEREST THIS HQ AND IS CONSIDERED HIGHEST
PRIORITY PD DESIRE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE OF SUBJ AND AUSTRIAN SINGER AFTER
SCHEDULED MEETING PRIOR ONE NOV CURR PD PROMISE LUCRATIVE ASYLUM WITH DELIVERY OF
MIG PD FOUR THREE ZERO CIC DET IS NOT RPT NOT TO BE CONTACTED AT THIS TIME PD CAREFUL
PLANNING AND TIMELINESS ESSENTIAL TO CLINCH DEAL PD PARAMOUNT THAT UR PLANS INCLUDE
SINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM SOV ZONE CMM AUSTRIA PRIOR SUBJ'S DESERTION WITH MIG PD IN
EVENT SUBJ CANNOT DELIVER MIG WHAT PLAN FORMULATED TRANSFER SUBJ FROM SOV ZONE AUSTRIA
TO UNCLE SUGAR SANCTUARY QUERY FOL FACTORS REQUIRED IN PRIORITY SEQUENCE CMM FLEXIBLE
TO SITUATION CLN ONE PD INDUCE SUBJ TO ESCAPE WITH LATEST TYPE MIG AND LAND IN UNCLE
SUGAR ZONE CMM GERMANY PD TWO PD IF IMPOSSIBLE RECOMMEND HE BRING CONSTRUCTION PLANS
OF MIG PD THREE PD TARE OBOE AND EASY DOCUMENTS PD FOUR PD IMPORTANT TECHNICAL MANUALS
AVAL TO SUBJ PD FIVE PD ABLE DASH TWO FILES IF OBTAINABLE PD SIX PD ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS
SUBJ WOULD CONSIDER VALUABLE TO THE ENEMY PD RECOMMEND UR FILE COPY OF MESSAGE DOG

DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION BY THIS COMMAND

Page

Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 OF 2 PAGES

REGRADUATED UNCLASSIFIED

OCT 14 1997

BY: [Signature]

Auth Para 1-6.3 DoD 5200.1-R

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

REGRADED
COLB
HQ 66TH JC DET.

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)
CO, HQ 66th CIC DET., USAREUR
MR RISSINGER

TO:
CO, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP 300845 0c		PRECEDENCE FOR:		ACTION	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE		PRIORITY	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION D-2583		CLASSIFICATION Secret			

CATION SERVES AS AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION PD RESULTS UR MEETING WITH AUSTRIAN SINGER
AT FREILASSING CMM GERMANY DESIRED THIS HQ MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS SOONEST PD CITE
RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEY

M/R: Self-explanatory. Coordinated with Majors MALEADY, GALLAGHER, ROSE 29 Oct 52.
MLR

Attention is invited to para 4, SR 100-32-10, which prescribes that
distribution of the nature, source, or even the existence of such
confidential intelligence information (C.I.) is restricted in such a report
as to be made only to those personnel who are authorized to receive it.
This restriction applies to all personnel, regardless of their position or
rank, and to all personnel, regardless of their assignment or duty station.
The Department of the Army, or higher authority, must approve the
distribution of such information. It will be considered a violation of AR 308.

REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL D. A. T...
HQ 66TH JC DET,
14 Nov 52

Page 2 of 2 Pages
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OCT 14 1997
BY ...
Auth Para 1-503 Do

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT NAME (and signature, when required) MARVIN L RISSINGER, DAC/jd		RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE - 9 -	
SYMBOL D-278482	TELEPHONE 344	OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Operations	

REGRADED
COL. B. A. TOMEY
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

1/ct by

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: ROEMER, REGION IV MUNICH

FOR ACTION: ROSE, HQS 66TH CIC DET US

FOR INFO:

REFERENCE NR: D-2583

PRIORITY

CODE CLERK: JEFFRIES
MSG STCD: EST NO

T00290945Z OCT 52

TOR291105Z OCT 52

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

SUBJ SOVIET AIR FORCE COLONEL, BADEN NEAR VIENNA. REF CONVERSATION ROSE, RISSINGER, AND BAINWOL 27 OCT CURR. INTERROGATION OF 0-0123-IV INDICATED SUBJ MAIN PROBLEM IS HIS TRAVEL WESTWARD THROUGH SOVIET ZONE AUSTRIA. SUBJ PLANS TO DESERT WITH AN AUSTRIAN FEMALE SINGER NAME UNKNOWN. ARRANGED MEETING WITH SINGER BETWEEN SOURCE AND REGION IV AGENTS AT FREILASSING, GERMANY, ON AUSTRO-GERMAN BORDER WILL TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO 1 NOV CURR TO PRECLUDE DELAY OR FAILURE. SUBJ DEFECTION IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, IS MORE PROBABLE NECESSITATING COORDINATION WITH 430 CIC DET FOR AIR TRANS FROM VIENNA AND TRAVEL OF AGENTS BAINWOL AND PEDZORA TO VIENNA.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. J. Clay III by D.W.

19 AUG 1958

D-278482

on TWX to Reg IV 30 Oct 52
Coordinated with Majors Mulcahy
Hollagher & Rose 29 Oct 52

Hq's 66th TSC Log No.
H-6229

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL. B. A. TOMEY, BY
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL. B. A. TOMEY, BY
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

Page 1 of 1 Pages
2 Copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66TH COMBAT INTELLIGENCE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

INCOMING MESSAGE

COLL: SHERA
ASC: JWC: YES X10

FROM: CIC LIAISON OFFICE HEIDELBERG

TO: 221255Z SEPT 52

FOR ACTION: CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

FOR: 221326Z SEPT 52

FOR INFO: G-2 SEVENTH ARMY

REFERENCE NO:

M-4326

PRIORITY

NO FEE NOT REQUIRED
SECRET COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
NO DECLASSIFYING

// INFORMATION FROM PRAGUE REPORTS RECURRENT RUMOR PAST FEW DAYS SOVIET MARSHAL KONEV TOGETHER WITH EIGHT MEMBERS HIS RUSSIAN STAFF HAVE ESCAPED. RUMOR GIVEN SOME CREDENCE BY CANCELLATION ON OR ABOUT 10 SEPTEMBER ALL RESERVATIONS AND CEREMONY SCHEDULED 13 SEPTEMBER WHEN CERTAIN MINES AND OTHER FACILITIES Kladno WERE TO BE DESIGNATED KONEV WORKS. ESCAPE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED IN KARLOVY AREA WHERE KONEV AND PARTY WERE TO TAKE THE BATHS. REQUEST HANDLING AGENTS AND BORDER STATIONS BE ALERTED THIS RUMOR WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS SUBJECT. IN EVENT LEAD OBTAINED TO SUBSTANTIATE RUMOR OR APPEARANCE ANY OR ALL DEFECTORS THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST. HANDLING SHOULD BE EXPEDITED. //

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. J. J. Layton
on 18 AUG 1958

Cent. J. J.
D-278 487
JWC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADING UNDERSEAL
ON OCT 14 1997
BY 1 CDR USAINSCOM FDIP
Auth Para 1:503 DoD 5200.1-R

Page 1 of 2
Copy 1 of 2

Marshall I. S. KANEV. Accompanied Mrs. GOTTWARD on
receiving stand at 9 May 52 Military Parade, PBA 52

RD-306529/0 WDGS Int Rpt Dtd 3 June 52

KANEV, Ivan Stepanovich born 1897 Arkhangelsk
Marshall - Dept Minister of Armed Forces, Commander
of Ground Forces. RD 242488 SID signed May 48 Dec 47

KANEV, Jan.

Sov. Marshall - Advisor to CEPICK, Min of Defense
RD -169571 VII 23 Apr 57 Genl OB

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE:

MESSAGE FORM
HQ, 66th CIC Detachment

EXCLUDED FILTER

22 143
27/9/52

F-8146

SPACE ABOVE RESERVED FOR CQ CODE LETTERS

FROM: (Originator)
HQ 66TH CIC DETACHMENT

22 1500Z

DATE/TIME C-1		1545 SEPT 1952	
PRIORITY	FOR	ACTION	INFO
BOOK MSG		PRIORITY	
		ORIGINAL MSG	
MULTIPLE ADD		CRYPTOPRECAUTION	
		YES	NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION	

TO: CO, ALL CIC REGIONS EXCEPT REGION IX

INFO: Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Cal G. Kelly III by *VW*
on 19 AUG 1958

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ITEM DOG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION GLM QUOTE INFORMATION FROM PRAGUE REPORTS RECURRENT RUMOR PAST FEW DAYS SOVIET MARSHAL KONEV TOGETHER WITH EIGHT MEMBERS HIS RUSSIAN STAFF HAVE ESCAPED PD RUMOR GIVEN SOME CREDENCE BY CANCELLATION ON OR ABOUT ONE ZERO SEPTEMBER ALL RESERVATIONS AND CEREMONY SCHEDULED ONE THREE SEPTEMBER WHEN CERTAIN MINES AND OTHER FACILITIES Kladno WERE TO BE DESIGNATED KONEV WORKS PD ESCAPE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED IN KARLOVY AREA WHERE KONEV AND PARTY WERE TO TAKE THE BATHS PD REQUEST HANDLING AGENTS AND BORDER STATIONS BE ALERTED THIS RUMOR WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS SUBJECT PD IN EVENT LEAD OBTAINED TO SUBSTANTIATE RUMOR OR APPEARANCE ANY OR ALL DEFECTORS THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST PD HANDLING SHOULD BE EXPEDITED PD END UNQUOTE END CITE MALREADY SIGNED TOEMKY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USANEDCOM/OPF

13
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature when possible)
EUGENE L. MALREADY, MAJOR, TC

APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION PAGE OF PAGES
COPIES OF COPIES
SIGNATURE

Eugene L. Malready

SYMBOL

TELE. NO.

OFFICIAL/TITLE

CHIEF, OPERATIONS SECTION

CICOP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) + (b)(3) For CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 14-26

HEADQUARTERS
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742 US Army

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 April 1951

SUBJECT : Progress Report

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAEUR, APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Colonel Hardick

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of
W. J. [Signature] by *W. J. [Signature]*

19 AUG 1958

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September 1950, 552 (b) (6)
Subject: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL).

2. All contacts and leads reported in previous reports are still being exploited and followed up in an attempt to defect Soviet military and civilian personnel. Exceptions to this are the cases of [redacted] and [redacted] mentioned in paragraph 4 of report dated 18 January 51 and [redacted] mentioned in paragraph 5 of report dated 18 January 51. It has been determined, through East zone police sources, that [redacted] is being held for serious political crimes. No trace of [redacted] has been found. [redacted] through the indiscretion of his fiancée [redacted] was arrested in Neu-Rupin by the Soviets. In an attempt to save their necks both [redacted] and [redacted] agreed to assist in the luring of our contact agent into the Soviet sector. This was to be accomplished thru the ruse of telling him they had the Soviet Lieutenant waiting in a cafe just across the sector boundary from Wedding (French Sector). Our agent, the contact with [redacted] was to accompany [redacted] in her car to the supposed rendezvous. The route led thru a small portion of the Soviet sector. Both [redacted] and [redacted] were arrested by West Berlin police but no actual proof against them could be produced and they were released. At an interrogation by our people [redacted] practically admitted the above was true. Both are now afraid to return to the Soviet zone and are still in Berlin.

3. German Agent [redacted] mentioned in paragraph 7 of report of 18 January 51, has finally promised the defection of Soviet [redacted] stationed in AUE, on 28 May 51. In view of past experiences in such cases this office will consider it authentic when [redacted] is delivered into our hands in Berlin. (b)(6)

4. Contact has been established with a person, who, allegedly, was a white Russian Emigre to France and was forceably repatriated to the Soviets following the close of World War II. He ended up in Frankfurt am/Oder as Technical Engineer for Soviet Department "KETCH" and is, allegedly, responsible for all military construction in the Sovzone, East of Berlin. He is alleged to desire to defect and has expressed a wish to return to France. This case was with you by Lt Colonel Lerette at the time of his last visit to ID, EUCOM. German agent, [redacted] a singer in the city opera in Frankfurt am/Oder is the "go between" and [redacted] in Berlin on 2 April 51 for further negotiations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7880 MID

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(b)(6)

5. Contact has also been established with a Soviet Captain, known to agent only as [redacted] in Glau, bei Trebbin. This officer is supposed to be a teacher on the staff of Army "Funk und Nachrichten Dienst School in Glau. Contact man is a German barber named [redacted] who is working at his profession in the military Kaserne in Glau. According to [redacted] so (2) soviet Majors and twelve (12) enlisted men from the school staff were arrested recently for failure to carry out their duties and were accused of sabotage. Allegedly, the captain fears he will also be arrested and, with [redacted] assistance, will take advantage of 1 May 51 festivities and general laxness to defect to the Americans in Berlin.

(b)(6)

6. Through the Indian Mission here in Berlin our agent met an Indian National, Sitharan, who has been doing some business with the Soviet Trade Mission. Some time ago our agent was able to meet his girl friend, Annemaria Schuster, who works as a translator for the Soviets in Karlshorst and in the evenings teaches soviet officers the German language. She is in contact with a major [redacted] who has expressed to her his desire to defect to the West. Sitharan remains the contact between our agent and Schuster. She, allegedly, is to render her assistance out of idealism while, unknown to her, Sitharan will collect the reward.

7. Through a mutual acquaintance our agent was able to meet Dr TRUSCHNOWITSCH, the chief of the Committee for Greek Orthodox Refugees, located at 13 Giesler Strasse, Berlin-Wilmersdorf. Dr TRUSCHNOWITSCH was very cooperative and promised to let us have "first crack" at any military defectees he might come up with and to turn over to us any leads which he couldn't properly exploit. He states that he is in contact with several potential defectees but had only gotten one actual defector since January 51, a former soldier who had civilianized and was working as a bookkeeper in Magdeburg. In return for his cooperation we have promised him limited assistance in receiving relief parcels from the states, housing permits and interzonal passes. Our assistance will depend on the amount of his cooperation.

8. Since 1 March 51 this organization has initiated a project of seeking out names and addresses of persons in the East zone who are known to have close contact with the Soviets or an individual Soviet. In this connection notices are sent to these individuals under the name of "Internationales Hilfswerk" informing them that a relief package was been received in Berlin intended for delivery to them. Pick up must be made in Berlin. Some 20 such notices have been sent out and to date four (4) have appeared to claim their packages. One of these was [redacted] a waitress in an officer's mess just outside of Eberswalde. She has already returned one time and gave us additional names of girls who were keeping company with Soviet officers or soldiers. Her sister was the former girl friend of Soluschenko who deserted in 1949. She is to accompany the military unit on maneuvers in the Templin Area maneuvers but will return to Berlin on 2 May 51.

9. Further developments will be reported as they occur.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

28

Charles A. Murphy
CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major
Control Officer

OCT 14 1997

BY CDR USARMC
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5270.1-P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
7680 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742
US Army

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

18 January 1951

by Clayton W.
on 15 AUG 1958
SUBJECT: Progress Report

D-778482

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.C9 (31D/CFS/OCLE).

2. Last report required by above referred to letter was submitted on 18 December 1950.

3. All contacts and leads reported in previous reports are still being negotiated, in an attempt to defect Soviet personnel. As of this report no defectees have actually arrived at this Headquarters.

4. A young woman, [redacted], living in East Berlin and working professionally as a prostitute, was recently contacted through a German black marketeer, known as [redacted] and was recruited for the defector program. She regularly visits a Soviet Major, [redacted] in Potsdam. On the occasion of these visits she was taken secretly into his quarters. On 10 January 1951 she was scheduled to meet Onegov in Potsdam, but upon her arrival at the Bahnhof in Potsdam a German messenger from Onegov informed her that he was working and couldn't see her, however, he would come to her house in East Berlin the following week. On Tuesday evening she contacted [redacted] saying that Onegov had been at her house and had gone on to Pankow where he would wait and that she should bring him, [redacted] with her in order that Onegov could be better oriented as to what would happen to him in the event he defected. In this connection he asked that she meets him in Pankow with [redacted] who was to give him the picture. Both, [redacted] and [redacted] were driven to an S-Bahn station near the Pankow border and were sent in a Taxi to Pankow. Neither have been heard from since nor have they returned to their homes in the East sector.

CLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF Security Board
BY Cassidy, J. W. - S. 100.52
Date 10/16/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON OCT 14 1997
BY 7880 MID
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. A German Engineer, Imhoff, living in the West sector, is engaged to a woman doctor Stiehl in Neu-Ruppin. Dr. Stiehl has been treating a Soviet Lieutenant for Venereal Disease and has been asked by this Lieutenant as to how he could best defect to the West. On 4 January 1951, Imhoff was sent to Neu-Ruppin to pick up the Lieutenant and bring him to Berlin. He expected to be back not later than 8 January 1951. Imhoff has not returned nor has he been heard from since his departure. A report was received by this unit that two (2) Soviet officers, a Major and a Lieutenant, had disappeared from Neu-Ruppin on 16 January 1951 and that the Soviets were turning the town "inside out" an attempt to locate them. It is quite possible that the Lieutenant is the officer for whom Imhoff was sent and that they will eventually all three (3) turn up in Berlin.

6. A doctor, practicing in Eberswalde, has given us the name and an address of a German girl, who had infected two (2) Soviet officers with a venereal disease. The doctor had effected cures in all three (3) cases and informed us that now one of the Soviets was very desirous of marrying Klaebisch. The doctor desires to have nothing, whatsoever, to do with defecting Soviet personnel. On 12 January 1951 an agent was sent to contact Klaebisch. She was seen by this agent entering her house but before he could make contact with her, a Soviet officer entered the house and remained for over two (2) hours. Due to train schedules agent had to leave without making contact. New attempts are being made to exploit this case.

7. [redacted] a resident agent living in Aue, attempted to defect Soviet Captain [redacted]. Plans were all made toward their departure on the evening of 11 January 1951. Report received is that Petrenkov had discussed his defection with another Soviet officer, known only as "Sascha", and that Sascha had reported his imminent defection. [redacted] was arrested and [redacted] fled to Berlin. A friend of [redacted] living in Aue, brought his personal items and clothes to him and reported that another Soviet friend of his, Major Gravschenko, had visited her after [redacted] flight and, reportedly, expressed a desire to defect. [redacted] has agreed to go to Chemnitz provided he is furnished a different Identification pass. There he would meet, at a prearranged time and place, Gravschenko, and bring him to Berlin. A new Identification pass is being furnished Schubert and he plans to leave Berlin on or about 28 January 1951.

8. Two (2) sisters [redacted] and [redacted] working in Soviet General Depot # 399 in Bernau have been contacted and propositioned. Both have many contacts with Soviet personnel and occasionally date Soviet soldiers. Anna has agreed to come to Berlin for more definite talks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Concrete results obtained from the defector program have, so far, been somewhat disappointing. Many direct contacts have already been established with prospective Soviet defectors and the program itself is being aggressively pursued.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Charles A. Murphy
CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major Int.
Control Officer

~~31~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USN/SC01A F0122
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742 US ARMY

D-778482

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of
Col. Clay II by V.W.

18 December 1950

on 19 AUGUST 1950: Progress Report

Notes
WCP

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army

ATTN: Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL).

2. Initial report required by letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, was submitted on 17 November, 1950.

3. All Contacts reported in November under the above-cited directive are being aggressively pushed toward completion. "Willie", the proprietor of a restaurant in the DESSAU area mentioned in inclosure 1 to TOP SECRET Letter, your Hq, dated 13 November 1950, has been contacted and invited to BERLIN for consultation. A good chance exists that he will arrive during the holidays. []
[] of EBERSWALDE is still working in 82nd Regimental Officer's Mess there. She also is to come to BERLIN for a meeting. Charlotte SCHAUER has been located but not yet contacted.

4. A tenor singer of the City Opera in Frankfurt, known personally to our agent through his sister living in BERLIN, claims to know several Soviet Officers personally, including one (1) Lieutenant who wants to defect. He has promised to deliver him during the Christmas holidays. The singer is cautiously feeling out other Soviets to ascertain any additional potential defectors. The only other developed lead is through a sub-agent who is supposed to have left BERLIN Monday 18 December 1950 with intent to return Thursday, 21 December 1950, with a Soviet Defector.

5. In the implementation of directive referred to in par 1, above, this organization in addition to developing those leads furnished by ID, EUCOM, and those already on hand, has established contacts in West Berlin Organizations and institutions where East Germans normally report, such as RIAS, American Consulate, and Newspaper offices, with a view towards referral of possible contacts to us for development.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major
Control Officer

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(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
BY AUTHORITY OF
BY Carroll, J. W.
Name
Date
6 Nov 52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742
US ARMY

D 778482

17 November 1950

Classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of
by W.W.
9 AUG 1951

SUBJECT : Progress Report

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army

ATTN : Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OP, /COLL).

2. Above cited directive was received by this organization on 26 September 1950. On 28 September a field grade officer, in addition to his other duties, was assigned to work on this project and on 13 November this officer was relieved of all other duties and charged specifically with carrying out the directive outlined in above cited directive. (b)(6)

3. As of this report only one of the operational leads, furnished in referenced letter, has been run down. [redacted] a waitress in an officers mess in Eberswalde, has been contacted and informed our agent that both Gromada and Solushchenko had been returned to the Soviet Union. A special effort is being made to penetrate DOM No. 9 in BERNAU and also to establish contact with Suyetov, Comptroller for the 399 Depot, also located in Bernau. To date, no concrete results have been obtained. (b)(6)

4. In addition to those leads furnished in subject directive, definite contact has been established with the following Soviet Personnel:

[redacted] Is located in Luckenwalde, a staff officer of the Third Guards Army. Informant states subject officer is in charge of commissary and Post Exchange sales and distribution. Contact was made through a former female friend who fled Luckenwalde about a month ago. She had worked in the army commissary and was connected with a discrepancy in the sales accounts. She is now living in West Berlin without permission of the authorities and without funds. She claimed that she and Kord-elleff had discussed his not returning to the Soviet Union and seemed sincere in her belief that she needed only to contact him to have him come to Berlin. She outlined a very circuitous plan to our agent which she was going to use to establish contact and bring said officer into West Berlin. Prospects of his actual defection appear to be quite good. 33 (b)(6)

[redacted] Is located in Eberswalde, a staff officer of the Fourth Guards Army. Contact was established through a Latvian underground operating in the Soviet Zone with

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BY AUTHORITY OF

BY Carroll Rich Walsh - 6 Dec 52

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a cell in Berlin. The member of the underground with whom our agent is working states that his people have discussed [redacted] defection with him and that he definitely desired to leave. On one occasion, a female was sent to Berlin from Eberswalde for the alleged purpose of making certain that it was the Americans and not the French or British who was to receive defector. Contact with the underground's Berlin representative has been found to be difficult and irregular by reason of his frequent trips into the East Zone. This case, at times, does not appear to be completely bonifide and is being handled very cautiously by our agent. Prospects of obtaining subject officer as defector cannot be ascertained at this time.

(b)(6) [redacted] (Last Name Unknown) - Is located in Potsdam, a Staff Officer of some military unit. A female, with whom he has carried on an affair over the past four (4) years is our contact. She divulged subject officer's intent not to return to the Soviet Union to our agent. At the meeting she refused to tell his last name or his exact staff position, saying that he held number two spot on the staff concerned. She also stated that he had intended to defect in 1946 but that she had dissuaded him because of the possibility of his being turned back. The female friend plans a visit with this officer in the very near future and has assured our agent that she will bring him into west Berlin to "talk things over". She requested a guarantee of assurance that, if he so desired, he would be permitted to return to Potsdam. Developments in this case would tend to reflect very good prospects of subjects defection.

5. Most of the leads furnished in letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, are being followed up and several other new ones are being exploited but are not yet sufficiently developed to be included in this report.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

34
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Charles A. Murphy
CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major Inf
Control Officer

ON OCT 14 1947
BY CDR USAF (M) (M) (M)
Auth Para 1-503 DoD 5200.14

~~TOP SECRET~~

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250.00 (SI/CI/S/COI)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

13 November 1980

b1+b3
for CIA

1. D/Int [] 13 Nov 80

1. Reference is made to our Top Secret Int. Basic subject, dated 23 August 1980, and to your reply of 5 September 1980.

2. Pursuant to procedure which evolved from the referenced correspondence, there is enclosed herewith a carbon copy of material from one additional interrogation on the subject, along with a copy of our letter to V880th MID in Berlin forwarding the same material and instructing them to coordinate the exploitation of any leads with [] on the Berlin level.

b1+b3
CIA

3. Your reply that this arrangement is still satisfactory will be appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Incl: 1/r
WR/Pol: 111 8074

V. J. HARTLEY
Col 800
Chief, Collection Section

M/R: Referenced correspondence is in TSC Folder "Operational leads for Defection of Sov Mil Personnel" E-1235 and E-1299. Referenced material is excerpts from interrogation of PAVICHENKO (PIR-170), 27 Oct 80 TSC Reg #E-1578, also in same folder.

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E AUTHORITY OF *Screening Board*
BY *Carroll Smith* *WAC-6* *6 Dec 83*
Name Grade Date

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ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USAN/SJ/NF/000
Auth Para 1-603 DOD 5200.106

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) + (b)(3) For CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

D-278482

350.09 (OID/OPS/COLL)

APC 403
21 September 1950

SUBJECT: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting
Soviet Military Personnel

TO: Commanding Officer
7880 MI Detachment
APO 742, US Army

1. Herewith are carbon copies of the following correspondence:

a. IRS from this Division to ^{(b)(1)} 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA basic subject, 25 August 1950, forwarding potential operational leads for the defection of Soviet military personnel, as obtained from Soviet deserters interrogated at ECIC.

b. Inclosures to the above-cited IRS, namely:

(1) Copy of SRI 347-50

(2) Excerpts from ECIC letter replies to SRI 347-50, Subject: "Desertion Motives and the MIS", dated as follows:

- (a) 9 May 1950 on PIR-156
- (b) 19 June 1950 on PIR-158
- (c) 22 June 1950 on PIR-157
- (d) 24 April 1950 on PIR-150
- (e) 26 July 1950 on PIR-159
- (f) 25 July 50 on PIR-161

c. Letter to this Division basic subject, 5 September 1950, in reply to basic IRS, authorizing and suggesting that these leads be sent to 7880th MID for exploitation.

(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

d. Request that you establish or emerge a system to attempt the exploitation of as many as practicable of the potential leads in this material for the purpose of inducing the defection of all possible Soviet military personnel. As is outlined in the attached correspondence, your activities in this direction are to be coordinated.

(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

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BY AUTHORITY OF

BY *Carroll Smith, WFO-8 Dec 52*

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350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)

21 Sept 1950

SUBJ: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet Military Personnel

3. It is felt that the German personnel mentioned in the attached reports are of high potential value in making contacts with Soviet personnel, and that a definite program should be established for contacting each of them. It is also desired, of course, that the Soviet military personnel be contacted if possible.

4. Letter requests should be submitted for any additional funds necessary for this project.

5. It is also requested that you submit a monthly progress report, Top Secret, basic subject, to reach this Division on the 20th of each month beginning 20 November 1950.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

(b)(6)

Incls: a/s
Tel: Heid MIL 0074

Colonel GSC
Chief, Collection Section

(b)(1) for C/17
5 USC 552 (b) (3)

COORD: Col ☐ Lt Col ☐ Maj ☐ Capt ☐

(b)(6)

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D-77848✓

350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

23 August 1950

THE JCH/MSJ WFP/MSJ

1 D/Int 23 Aug 1950

2. This Division is interested in attempting to induce the desertion of more Soviet military personnel.

3. This LHM is written to effect the operational coordination which it is felt will bring the best results, and to comply with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 13, "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States", dated 19 January 1950.

4. Attached hereto are all pertinent excerpts from interrogation reports of Soviet military deserters, received from ECIC in answer to our SHI 347-50. Attached also, for your information, is a copy of SHI 347-50. As you will see, only certain parts of it contribute potential leads for defecting Soviet military personnel; those parts have been extracted for purposes of this paper, but the entire reports are available to you for study or copying whenever you desire them.

5. It is believed that the individuals who might be induced to defect as the result of exploitation of these leads are of the "low-level" type in which you are not primarily interested. They are Soviet military personnel, however, and as such are of high interest to us, even though they may be only Privates or low-ranking NCOs.

5. [

6. In the belief that our exploitation of the leads in which you are not interested is, in the long run, in the interest of efficiency, this division desires to undertake the inducing of the defection of Soviet military personnel who might be contacted through the information contained in the attached material.

7. It is requested, therefore, that you review the attached material with the idea of releasing to this division as many as possible of the operational leads contained therein. In addition to the Soviets mentioned in the reports, it is desired that you indicate your interest or disinterest in exploiting the contact potentialities of the Germans listed in the reports.

8. It is also requested that this division be kept informed of the successful results of exploitation of any leads from this material, if any is used by your organization.

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(b)(1) Dec 1/14
USC 552 (b) (3)

(b)(6)

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350.07 (GID/OPS/COLL)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

25 August 1950

It is tentatively planned by this Division that
the 7880th MID will be given the released information for exploitation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

(b)(6)

Incls: Copy of SRI 347-50
Excerpts from KCIC Ltrs.

9 May 50 on PIR-156, TSC #E-601
19 June 50 on PIR-150, TSC #E-852
22 June 50 on PIR-157, TSC #E-861
24 April 50 on PIR-150, TSC #E-572
26 July 50 on PIR-159, TSC #E-1007
28 July 50 on PIR-161, TSC E-100
(All Subj: "Desertion Motives
and the RIS")

Lt Col C. C.
Chief, Coll Sec

Tel: Main 141 0074

L/R: The above information has been collected and studied since April and
it is now believed that this type information is of sufficient value to
warrant exploitation. This IRS is the first step in evolving an SCP for the
exploitation of all such future leads obtained.

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



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Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hq 7707 ECIC, 19 Jun 50, subj: Desertion Motives and the RIS

Source does not know who censors the mail from the USSR. He says that the censorship stamps on mail received in his unit bore widely different numbers but he does not recall what they were or what they designated. He believes mail from his unit was censored by a censorship unit near JUETERBOG (the only such unit he knows of in the Soviet Zone of Germany). At this location, he observed Russian women in officers' and non-commissioned officers' uniforms and heard that they worked for the censorship unit. He knows no further details.

Soviet personnel may send photographs in their letters but they are not allowed to write the location of their unit, its name or number, their branch of service, TO or T/E data, the name of the commanding officer, anything concerning the type or quantity of food served, complaints of any kind, or anything derogatory to the Soviet army, the Soviet government, or to Communism.

Censurable material is blacked out. Source never heard of any penalties for infraction of censorship rules. Soviet personnel may not send mail to Germans or receive mail from them.

24. What security functions are exercised by the city Kommandanturas in the Soviet Zone, with regard to: (a) Soviet Army personnel; (b) German population; (c) foreign travelers?

The Kommandantura patrols checked papers of Soviet Army personnel in public places and entered cinemas and restaurants to see whether Soviet Army personnel were present. The patrols exercised no controls over the German population except to arrest malefactors detected, flagrante delicto. Source does not know what control the Kommandantura exercises over foreigner travelers inasmuch as he was not aware of their being any travelers in the Soviet Zone.

25. What secret document section do you know of? Did your unit have one? Do you know what was kept there? Who is in charge of it? Who are the couriers for secret documents? Did you ever handle secret documents? If so, describe your duties.

(b)(6)

Source says that each regiment and division had a secret documents section which filed secret papers and orders. Sergeant [] was in charge of the secret documents section of the 22nd Regiment and a captain (name unknown), and Sergeant Major [] were in charge of the divisional section. These sections were located in the headquarters building of the regiment and the division. [] was regimental courier for secret documents. Source does not know who was the divisional courier and never handled secret documents himself.

Page 11 of 12 pages

Copy 2 of 5 copies

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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page ~~(8)~~ 90

16 June 1950

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirement No. M- 159

FROM : Chief, Analysis Branch, (Military Section, Requirements Desk)

TO : Chief, Operations Branch (Attn: Collection Section, O/B Desk)

1. References: **Top Secret Letter from Hq, 7707 ECIC to CO, 66 CIC**
Det., Subj: "Potential Soviet Deserter, dtd 8 Jun 50.

2. Suspense date: 1 July 1950. Unsatisfied portions of
requirement ~~(XXXX)~~ (are not) desired after suspense date. Answer (is) (~~XXXXXX~~)
required on OCS Form 17.

3. The requirement:

Request that ECIC be instructed to determine through interrogation
of GROMOV (PIR-166) what additional information, if any, might be
expected by interrogation of Private BROVCHENKO, former aide to
GROMOV.

This information is desired before serious consideration is given to
inducing desertion of BROVCHENKO.

CARL A. WEAVER
Lt Col GSC
Ch, Mil Sect

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ON 10 Oct 97
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Screening Board
Laurel Smith, 6406-84032
Date

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- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 92 - 122

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)

AP0 403
13 April 1950

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION NUMBER: 147-20

SUBJECT: Brief on Desertion Motives and on R.I.S.

TO: Commanding Officer

7707 ECIC

AP0 791, US Army

1. It is desired that ten Soviet deserters, regardless of unit or previous association with the Russian Intelligence Service, be interrogated in accordance with the attached brief, as follows:

a. Interrogate the following as soon as practicable:

(b)(6) (1) [] (PIR-156)
(2) [] (PIR-157)
(3) [] (PIR-158)
(4) [] (PIR-159)
(5) [] (PIR-161)

b. Interrogate the next five Soviet deserters who arrive at ECIC.

2. As complete an answer as may be procurable must reach this division by 16 June 1950. If no information has been forwarded to reach this office by that date, negative answer (written or telephonic) is required by that date. OCS Form 17 will not be used in answering the requirement.

3. All replies to the requirement will make specific reference to Control Number: SIR 147-50.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

1 Incls
2/5

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INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: V-10231

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Deserters

DATE: 3 March 1950

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	Region V	Hqs. 66th CIC Attn: PYLE	3 Mar 50	<p>1. Forwarded herewith Agent Report, Subject, file and date as above, for your information.</p> <p>2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:</p> <p>a. Source of Information: Border Police in PASSAU.</p> <p>b. Method by which Information was Obtained: Information relayed to reporting Agent by Source.</p> <p>c. Chain of Sources and Sub-Sources: <input type="checkbox"/> , to Border Police PASSAU to agent.</p> <p>d. Evaluation and name of Each: <input type="checkbox"/> , evaluated "F". Border Police, evaluated "C".</p> <p>e. Position of Source in Relation to Target: As stated in Agent's Report.</p> <p>f. Date of Information: 25 February 1950.</p> <p>g. Date Information reported by Source: 25 February 1950.</p>

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

INCL: ~~AR~~ s/s (3)

LOG NO. 14479

DIST: 3 - Hqs. 66th CIC Det.
1 - Region V files

(b)(6) ☐ /Regensburg 7-259/ext 1

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124

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(Classification)

(over)

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TAR/VES

AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Soviet Deserters

2. DATE SUBMITTED

3 March 1950

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

V-10231

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. At 2200 hours on Saturday, 25 February 1950, Border Police Headquarters, PASSAU (M49/Q21), notified the undersigned that they had just received word from Josef KHNLE, Chief of the Border Police, Landkreis WEGSCHEID, that two Soviet soldiers had deserted from URFAHR, Austria, and supposedly were headed for the Austrian border. The names of the two deserters were given as [] and []

2. Information received on 26 February 1950 from the Border Police Headquarters, PASSAU, revealed that they had neither seen nor apprehended anyone answering the description of the above named individuals during the previous night. (F-3)

3. AGENT'S NOTES: In the past Soviet deserters have been reported to the Border Police, but during the past several months none have managed to reach Bavaria unless stationed in the immediate border vicinity, as distance and risk of capture is too great.

APPROVED:

Glenn E. Franks

GLENN E. FRANKS
Team Commander
CE Team

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125

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

THOMAS A. RHODES, S/A, 66th CIC Detachment
Region V, REGENSBURG

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Thomas A. Rhodes

WD 480 FORM 1 JUN 47 341

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-48407-1

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CIC FILE

D-238470

Desertion of Four (4) Soviet Officers

12 January 1950

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of

Col. J. C. Clark III by *V. W.*

19 AUG 1958

on

1 Hqs CO CIC 12 Jan 1. Information received
68th Reg SO indicates that four (4) Soviet officers deserted
CIC IX from the Transient Camp at MEISSEN (Saxony) about
Det X 17 November 1949 and made their way via CHEMNITZ
III to the BRAUNSCHWEIG-RINGELAHN area in the British
Zone of Germany, arriving there on or about 23 November 1949.

2. Descriptions of two (2) of the officers
are as follows: (b)(6)

a. , fnu: Height about
6'; slim; broad shoulders; narrow waist. Apparent age about 38. Light
brown wavy hair combed straight back. Normal ears, flat. Blue eyes of
medium size. Bushy eyebrows. A rather pointed chin, not cleft. Upper
second tooth (side not known) covered with yellow metal. Hollow cheeks.
Weatherbeaten complexion, brownish. Upright carriage. Rather flat-footed
gait. May be wearing double-breasted suit of thickish weave, with red
lines about 1 cm wide crossing to form 3 cm squares on a light brown
background. May be wearing officers' black boots under trousers and a
leather jacket over suit. (b)(6)

b. , fnu: Height about
5' 6"; stout; broad shoulders; pot belly; apparent age about 38. Hair
turning grey from chestnut brown, bald on top. Small ears. Inconspicuous
small eyes and eyebrows. Broad face; receding chin melts into neck. A
"piggish" face. Normal teeth, clean. Sallow complexion. Upright carriage
short-stepped rolling gait. May be wearing single-breasted suit of same
material as SOKOLOV's. May be wearing a grey neck-high pullover and
ordinary shoes. (b)(6)

3. state that Subjects have not
been located and that it appears they may have proceeded to the US Zone
of Germany. It is requested that this office be notified if any of
Subjects should come to your attention.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL ERSKINE:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 14 OCT 1997
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

GEORGE L. WILSON
Major Inf
S-2/S-3

Capt FYLE/dw/Stgt 93483/ext 19
OPS

126

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~~SECRET~~
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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)

APD 403
3 January 1950

SUBJECT: Desertion of Four Soviet Officers

TO: 1. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq U.S. Constabulary, APD 46
② Commanding Officer, 66 CIC Detachment, APD 154

(X) (P)

1. Information received [] indicates that four Soviet officers deserted from the Transient Camp at MEISSEN (Saxony) about 17 November 1949 and made their way via CHEMNITZ to the BRAUNSCHWEIG-RINGELHEIM area in the British Zone of Germany, arriving there on or about 23 November 1949.

(b)(6) 2. Descriptions of two of the officers are as follows:

(b)(6) a. [] fnu. Height about 6'; slim; broad shoulders; narrow waist. Apparent age about 38. Light brown wavy hair combed straight back. Normal ears, flat. Blue eyes of medium size. Bushy eyebrows. A rather pointed chin, not cleft. Upper second tooth (side not known) covered with yellow metal. Hollow cheeks. Weatherbeaten complexion, brownish. Upright carriage. Rather flat-footed gait. May be wearing double-breasted suit of thickish weave, with red lines about 1 cm wide crossing to form 3 cm squares on a light brown background. May be wearing officers' black boots under trousers and a leather jacket over suit.

(b)(6) b. [] fnu. Height about 5'6"; stout; broad shoulders; pot belly; apparent age about 38. Hair turning grey from chestnut brown, bald on top. Small ears. Inconspicuous small eyes and eyebrows. Broad face; receding chin melts into neck. A "piggish" face. Normal teeth, clean. Sallow complexion. Upright carriage, short-stepped rolling gait. May be wearing single-breasted suit of same material as SOKOLOV's. May be wearing a grey neck-high pullover and ordinary shoes.

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
(S)(7)(D)
3. ~~_____~~ subjects have not been located and that it appears they may have proceeded to the U.S. Zone of Germany. It is requested that this office be notified if any of subjects should come to the attention of your organization. (b)(6)

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

[]
C- []
A- []

Tel: Heid Mil 8135

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division
APO 402, US Army

28 Nov 49

350.09 (GID/A Br/Military)

SUBJECT: Soviet Deserter ~~_____~~ (b)(6)

TO : ~~_____~~ (b)(7)(D)

Dear ~~_____~~ (b)(6)

We have a question pertaining to the interrogation of Senior Sergeant ~~_____~~. In the detailed interrogation report of 15 October he gives his unit throughout as the 22 Ods Hvy Tk "Bn", whereas in the initial interrogation he gave his unit as the 82 Ods Hvy Tank "Bn". Our O/B records show the 82nd to be the organic heavy tank unit of the 6 Ods Cadre Tank Division. We would appreciate your comment on this apparent numerical discrepancy between the two reports.

Further, for your information we have reached the conclusion after long study, that ~~_____~~ information is to be treated with considerable reserve, especially as pertains to the date of the information. In reviewing the pros and cons of your possible explanations of his information, we are inclined to favor paragraph 3 a. --- that is, that he deserted at an earlier date. The case "against" this possibility (the fact that he had knowledge of the demobilization of the Class of 1925) we feel can be explained by the fact that this demobilization was very late in coming and that it was advertised and talked about and predicted for almost a year before it actually came to pass. Therefore he could well have had knowledge of it in 1948.

Other pieces of his information, particularly the very confused O/B given, in any event tend to shed an unfavorable light on the rest of his statements. For this reason we give very little weight to his use of the cadre nomenclature as it affects our present analysis of the status of cadre formations.

In this connection, you will notice in our SIS AB that the latest vehicle number analysis still indicates an approximate 50% strength in the cadre units.

With best personal regards to all of your crew,

Sincerely yours,

~~_____~~
12/9

Major CAV

As above refers to interrogation of Sr. Sgt. ~~_____~~, Moscow, 1949.
deserter file. ~~_____~~

File in 12/9

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ON 19 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Caveau Smith, 10/16/52 - 10/16/52
(b)(6)

D-27848V
Secret Counter
Potential

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

AF0 103
3 November 1949

CRNS/AD/COIL/CS/AF/AR

[

] (b)(7)(D)

D-278482

AM

(b)(6)

I am happy that we were able to adjust the [] matter to our mutual satisfaction. [] and [] of your office arrived at ECIO 24 October 1949 and spent several days talking to the men.

You mention one class of cases concerning which you do not feel you will be able to release full information, and with this thought I am in complete accord. There may likewise be certain individuals from time to time on whom we will not be in a position to give you information, for operational reasons, and I feel sure that you will appreciate the need for a mutual understanding of this sort. It is anticipated that such instances will occur very infrequently, if at all.

Please be assured of my desire for continuation of the spirit of friendly cooperation and confidence which we have enjoyed in the past.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

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ON 19 SEPT 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

[]
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

(b)(6)

L/R: Draft of this ltr approved by [] 31 Oct 49 - ltr fr []
10th Oct 49, TS #D2489 refers.

130

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AUTHORITY OF CIL Ltr 25 Aug 52 82240

5) Carroll Major 10016-24 Sep 52
Name Grade Date

D-2639
3

278482
EUROPEAN COMMAND

Office of the Director of Intelligence
APO 742, U.S. Army

September 1949

[(b)(7)(D)
Dear [(b)(7)(D)

(b)(6) I have investigated the case of the Soviet deserter, [(b)(7)(D) which you called to my attention in your letter of 31 August 1949, file number HQ INT DIV/S/PF. 56644.

When [(b)(7)(D) first came into our control, interrogation revealed that he had possibilities for use as an agent against the Soviets. Information concerning him was therefore given very limited distribution pending an investigation concerning the advisability of using him in this manner. As you will readily understand, [(b)(7)(D) value operationally would be appreciably decreased by a widespread dissemination of any information concerning his contact with our intelligence people.

After he had been in our custody for a sufficient "cooling off" period to enable Soviet interest in him to wane, a more liberal distribution of the reports was made at which time you were forwarded the reports. At that time, he was to be used in the very near future on a special mission; hence, our statement that he no longer was available for interrogation. (b)(6)

Circumstances arising since our communication have obviated the use of [(b)(7)(D) on this project. He is therefore available for interrogation by your representatives, and we will release him to you if you desire. I have advised my staff that in future cases of this type your Headquarters will be advised of all defectors and deserters even though they are to be used operationally.

131

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF *Security Board*
BY *Samuel D. Smith, Lt. Col. - 9 Dec 52*
Name
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ON 19 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

(b)(7)(D)
17C
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4
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41
D. TSC
0-2097
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~~_____~~
~~_____~~
Information concerning individuals who are to be used as agents must be treated with utmost security, and I ask your assistance and cooperation in this respect. If the mission is immediate, as was contemplated in this case, the individual may not be available for your interrogation for a certain period.

I am sorry that our actions in this matter were a source of concern to you and am very grateful for your frank statements concerning them. I assure you of my complete confidence in our full mutual exchange of information, and I trust that this letter will remove any lack of confidence therein that may have arisen in your mind.

Sincerely,

C *J16X6*
Maj. Gen. USAF
Director of Intelligence

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ON 19 SEPT 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

131a
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

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Soviet Potential D-278482

350.09 (OID/OPS/IS)

(b)(6)

18 August 1949

DD/ID [] 18 Aug 49

1. Forwarded for your information, per requests from [] and [], are the inclosed interrogation reports on [] (alias []), Soviet deserter, who was formerly a 1st Lieutenant in the MGB.

2. These reports were not previously forwarded to your office since they contained operational leads which had to be checked. Subject is no longer available for further interrogation. It is requested that these reports and the identity of the subject be handled with the greatest possible security, and dissemination be limited as much as possible.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

13 Incls:

Report Nos:

LCol, GSC
Chief, Control Branch

1. R-1/35-49 ID EUCOM--1 copy
2. RT-4-49 (PIR-20)--ECIC--5 copies
3. CI-856 RT-113-49 ECIC--4 copies
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(S) 13 [] (b)(7)(D)
3 file
4 C/R
5 del

RT/MA/Head M11 8135

(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

Coordinated with []
M/R May Miller, USCO, and Capt []

132

(b)(6)

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D-1776
3

CIC Ltr 25 Aug 52 82-2570
Curren Smith WOD6 29 Sept 52

HQ EUROPEAN COMMAND

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D-238482


TO : CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY FOR DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

FROM : HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND SGD HUEBNER

REF NO : S-3253 CITE: ECGID T00: 071235Z

Reurad W-88995 dated 10 Sept 48. Further to ourad S-3106 dated 28 Sept 48. This division now in receipt of agent report re subject and will forward to you this date. If subjects story is correct he has possession of information of great value to this division. It is requested that if subject is to be sent to US that after guarantees of such action are given local Counter Intelligence agencies be allowed to exploit him prior to shipment.

W-83995 SMC IN 2043 10 SEP 48 DD/Int
S-3106 28 SEP 48 DD/Int



ORIGINATOR : DD/Int AUTHENTICATION: ☒ LT COL GSC

INFORMATION : AG RECORDS

(b)(6)

09 OCT 48 0645Z KV/maw REF NO: S-3253 T00: 071235Z

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133

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HEADQUARTERS

970th COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS Det.
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of REGION III - (BAD-NAUHEIM)

SUB-REGION DARMSTADT
APO 757

01/9 AUG 1958 File No. III-D-1507.1

19 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Desertion of Russian Troops, Rumored

RE : Infiltration of Soviet Personnel into the American and British Zones of Occupation, Rumored.

1. The information contained in this report was supplied to the undersigned by P-41-III-D through O-31-III-D (Except where otherwise specified), on 15 March 1947.

2. The following rumors were observed to be in circulation among DARMSTADT (L50/M64) KPD personalities during the period from 6 March 1947 - 13 March 1947:

a. Russian troops in Germany are at the present time showing a tendency to desert and cross into the American and British zones of Occupation, dressed in civilian clothes, for the purpose of establishing residence there, thus avoiding redeployment to Russia. This tendency is the result of rumors among Soviet forces that all Russian military personnel stationed in Germany for a long period of time will be prevented from returning to their homes in Russia, probably by imprisonment in internment camps, to prevent pro-German propaganda from being disseminated by these returning soldiers in their home localities.

(NOTE:) O-33-III-D, who travelled to the LEIPZIG (N52/E21) fair on 10 March 1947 and remained in that city for three (3) days, also reported a tendency among Russian troops to desert, don civilian clothes, and attempt to remain in Germany, rather than be redeployed to Russia)

b. The borders of the Russian zone are presently heavily guarded, both by Russian troops and by German police.

c. A Russian officer, residing in DRESDEN (N52/E21), Angelikastrasse, is supposed to have remarked that Russia will strike ("Losschlagen") in May 1947, since the time will be most opportune then.

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- 1 -

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(Desertion of Russian Troops, Rumored - Cont'd)

3.. Agent's comments, conclusions, and recommendations:

a. Evaluation: Paragraph #2a -- B-F-6
#2b -- B-F-6
#2c -- B-F-6

APPROVED:

John M. Parish
JOHN M. PARISH
Special Agent, CIC
Commanding

Max M. Halley
MAX M. HALLEY
Special Agent, CIC

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- 2 -

135

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