



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

December 4, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning Soviet Defections, ZF010285W. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the Army-originated information no longer warrants classification protection and is partially releasable to you. The records are enclosed for your use. Fees for processing this request are waived.

Since the release of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy rights of the individuals concerned this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code (b)(6).

In addition, since the release of the information in the records would reveal the identity of confidential sources, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

DOSSIER NO.

2FO10285W

As of 23 Aug 79 all material included
(Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Estelle Moulden OS-23-79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

ESTELLE MOULDEN GS-5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-1C
REVIEWED...
1

THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

4343

FROM: (Originator)

CO HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO: CO, 430TH CIC DET, USPA

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL
Cal. O. City II by J.W.

INFO: **ON**

SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CMM AUSTRIA PD RE OUR FOX NR EIGHT
EIGHT EIGHT THREE DTD FIVE NOV CURR CMM REQUEST YOUR COPY OF REFERENCED MSG
BE DOWNGRADED FROM TOP SECRET TO SECRET CLASSIFICATION AND THIS DET NOTIFIED
WHEN ACTION COMPLETED PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEY

M/R: SUBJ reportedly is a Soviet Air Force Col, who was originally reported willing to defect to the West. Subsequent info indicated that this was wishful thinking on the part of SUBJ's girl friend, who believes she can induce SUBJ to defect. 430th CIC Det has agreed to allow Reg IV to control case, and an effort will be made to accomplish SUBJ's desertion if feasible.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USAINSCB:1 FUIP
Auth Para 1.603 DoD 5200.47

**PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult
Cryptosentier Before Declassifying**

NAME (and signature, when required)

M. L. RISSINGER, DAC/jf

SYMBOL

TELEPHONE
283

LEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE *Capo
T. J. Kocejewski*
LICEN. NO. 1 MATE, ADY., MAJ., TO

~~OFFICIAL TIME~~
Chief, Operations Section

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES FORM DA 1 MAY 44
WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-53-500M-378

4337

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ROUTING

7-8903

0610487

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO. 91

CONFIDENTIAL

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO: CO, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. J. Clay [Signature]

INFO: on 19 AUG 1958

DATE-TIME GROUP 6 1015 Nov 52		ROUTINE	
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:			
IDENTIFICATION D-2599		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	

SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN AUSTRIA PD DESIRE UR MSG DOG DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE DTD TWO NINE OCT Curr AND OUR MSG FOX DASH EIGHT EIGHT SIX FIVE DTD ONE THREE OCT Curr BE DOWNGRADED FROM TOP SECRET TO SECRET CLASSIFICATION PD THIS CORRESPONDENCE SERVES AS AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION PD REUR DOG DASH TWO FIVE NINE NINE DTD FIVE NOV Curr WHAT ARE UR PLANS FOR FUTURE ACTION RE SUBJ QUERY WHEN CMM WHERE AND BY WHOM WILL AUSTRIAN SINGER BE MET QUERY PERTINENT POINTS LISTED IN OUR FOX DASH EIGHT EIGHT SIX FIVE STILL IN EFFECT PD EVAL OF SOURCES AND INFO DESIRED IN FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE PD WHAT ACTION CMM IF ANY CMM IS FOUR THREE ZERO CONTEMPLATING RE THIS CASE QUERY DESIRE THIS HQ BE INFORMED EXPEDITIOUSLY ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TOR [REDACTED] PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult Cryptosigner before declassifying

M/R: D-2599 dtd 5 Nov 52 from Reg IV pertains to case of SUBJ, however, sources and sub-sources may have exaggerated story. 430th CIC (Maj ALDRICH) briefed 4 Nov curr as to reason for contacting their source. Identity of SUBJ and Austrian singer unknown at this time.

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 320-320-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, sources, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered a violation of AR 320-5. **REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED**

RELEASER'S NAME (and signature, when required)		OCT 14 1959	
M. L. RISSINGER, DAC/JT		CDR USARSCUM FDPS	
RELEASER'S GRADE		Para 1.503 DOD 5200.10	
SYMBOL	TELEPHONE	3	
D-278482	283	EUGENE J. McBALDY, MAJ, flight	

SECURITY INFORMATION
REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

RELEASER'S SIGNATURE
EUGENE J. McBALDY, MAJ, flight
OFFICIAL TITLE
Chief, Operations Section

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ROUTING

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

16
1-8883

651440

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY
FROM: (Originator)

CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TO: CO, HQ 430th CIC DET, SALZBURG

~~REFRAGED CONFIDENTIAL, BY AUTHORITY OF~~
COL ~~Werry~~ *Col. C. E. Aldrich* D.C.
BY ~~Lawrence~~ *C. E. Aldrich* ORDC
INFO: ON 2d 16 25 Feb 56

DATE-TIME GROUP 5 0900 Nov 1952		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION ROUTINE	ROUTINE
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE <input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE <input type="checkbox"/> CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:		
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	

SUBJ SOV AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CRM AUSTRIA PD CONFIRMING CONVERSATION BAINWOL SLASH ALDRICH FOUR NOV CURR DEFLECTION OF SUBJ VIEWED WITH GREATEST INTEREST THIS HQ CMM PARTICULARLY IF DELIVERY OF MIG CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PLUS HIS KNOWLEDGE SOVIET AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES ETC AND TYPES DOCUMENTS HE MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN PD OBOE SUGAR ITEM NOT RPT NOT NOTIFIED PENDING RESULTS MEETING WITH SUBJ'S MISTRESS CMM STATUS AND MODE OF TRAVEL OF SUBJ ASCERTAINED PD ITEM DOG USAREUR INDIRECTLY NOTIFIED RE SUBJ PD CITE RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEY

M/R: Coordinated with Majors MALEADY, ROSE, GALLAGHER, and SULLIVAN
29 Oct 52.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. Consult
Communications Center before classifying

REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1952
BY CDR USAFNSCOM FOIPO
AND Para 1-602 DOD 5200.2

6390

Page 1 of 7 Pages

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Attention is invited to par 43, SR 380-200-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, source, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to be a violation of AR 380-5.

4

SECURITY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL		Page 1 of 1 PAGES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	ROUTINE	ROUTINE
REPLACES NAME (and signature, when required)		EUGENE L. MALEADY, MAJ, TC
NAME H. L. RISSINGER, DAC/jr	TELEPHONE 283	OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Operations Section
SYMBOL D-278482		

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES NAME FORM DR. 1 MAY 60
WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 8-52-500M-27802

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: ROEMMER, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH
FOR ACTION: RISSINGER, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

CODE CLERK: ALLEN
MSG SVCD: YES NO

TO: 051240Z NOV 52

TOR: 051346Z NOV 52

FOR INFO:

REFERENCE NR:

D-2599

~~PRIORITY~~

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

URMSG F-8865. SUBJ IS SOVIET AIR FORCE COLONEL, BADEN AUSTRIA. INTERROGATION SUB SOURCE OF SOURCE 0-0123IV IN SALZBURG AUSTRIA ON 4 NOV CURR DISCLOSED INFO CONCERNING SUBJ ORIGINATED WITH A PERSON EMPLOYED CAPACITY CASUAL SOURCE BY 430 CIC. EARLIEST INTERROGATION POSSIBLE OF 430 CIC SOURCE AT 2100 HOURS 4 NOV CURR DISCLOSED HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH AN AUSTRIAN NATIONAL FEMALE SINGER, RESIDENT OF BADEN, AUSTRIA WHO FOR PAST TWO YEARS HAD BEEN DATING A SOVIET AIR FORCE OFFICER STATIONED AT BADEN VIENNA. RANK OF OFFICER UNKNOWN TO SOURCE STATED IT TO BE BETWEEN MAJ AND COLONEL. 430 CIC SOURCE STATED TRUE STORY AS GIVEN BY SINGER IS NOT THAT SOVIET OFFICER WAS WILLING TO DESERT BUT THAT SHE BELIEVED HE WOULD DESERT IF SHE FORCED ISSUE. SOURCE WOULD NOT DIVULGE IDENTITY OF SINGER. AGREED TO CONTACT SINGER AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH REGION IV AGENTS. ALL PREVIOUS INFO AS REPORTED BY SOURCES NOW KNOWN TO REGION IV TO HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED. MAJ ALDRICH BRIEFED AS TO REASON FOR CONTACTING THEIR SOURCE. AGREED THAT REGION IV SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF CASE. REGION IV AGENTS WILL PURSUE CASE AGGRESSIVELY COMMENSURATE WITH CURR CASE COMMITMENTS. HIGHER CLASSIFICATION OF THIS MSG BELIEVED NOT WARRANTED.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. Maybury J.W.

D-278482

Twx to Region IV

on 19 AUG 1958
- 6 NOV 52

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON OCT 17 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPS
Auth Para 1.503 DOD 5200.20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 4 November 1952

TO : FILE (MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD)
 FROM : RISSINGER
 SUBJECT: Soviet Air Force Colonel on 19 AUG 1958

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

W. J. Day 16 Nov 1952

Captain ROEMER from CIC Region IV called and stated that matters have been complicated re SUBJECT since the sub-source and contact of ~~case~~ 0-123-IV is an employee (leg man) of the 430th CIC. S/A BAINWOL is in SALZBURG and could be reached thru telephone LD-30, SALZBURG. Matter discussed with Major ROSE and since we are dependent on the 430th CIC it was decided that this case would be coordinated with Major ALDRICH, Operations Officer, 430th CIC Det. only. BAINWOL will meet his contact at 1400 hours this date in SALZBURG and then will ~~return to his office~~ brief Major ALDRICH.

It is unknown whether the sub-source has mentioned anything to his employer, however, assistance to this point has been received from the 430th and additional aid will be required if the operation is to be successful.

Numerous complications such as ~~Austrian~~ license plates, telegrams, telephone calls and others have been encountered and therefore it ~~is~~ is felt that Major ALDRICH SHOULD be apprised of the limited information we have re SUBJECT.

S/A BAINWOL called from SALZBURG and discussed the situation and need for coordination with the 430th CIC. BAINWOL was instructed to call Major ALDRICH and to brief him after he has met the sub-source. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INFORMATION: Rissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997
 By CDR USASCOM FOIPO
 Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

File D-27848

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO TO MAJOR ROSE:

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of 2

MEMO TO MAJOR ROSE: ~~18 AUG 1958~~ and sent
Attached ~~is~~ ^{on} the correspondence which I have received/to
date regarding the Soviet Colonel in BADEN, Austria. I hesitate to
call the 430th CIC Detachment in on this one until we definitely know
that he can ^{PI sub} not come out with the MIG.. Major Gallagher ~~agrees~~ with me
too inasmuch as they gobbled one re the two Czech motorcyclists who
came to SALZBURG and as far as we know were ripe for defection.

that this case materializes. If so, bring it in, fill out, then notify the

that this case materializes

a) If the Colonel can bring a MiG out, then notify the US Air Force, to give all assistance necessary even to the point of sending an escort to the British Zone of Austria. This will require coordination with the Air Force, ID ~~ESAREUR~~, and with the British. The distance from BADEN, Austria to the British Zone ^{Austria} is less than 100 kilometers which means that in 10 minutes or less he could be Allied territory, should he run out of gasoline.

17. To suggest some consideration

out of gasoline.

b) If he cannot bring a MIG out, suggest some consideration
then be given for coordination with the 430th CIC and with the US Air
Forces. I'm sure that the Air Forces would be glad to send a plane to
VIENNA and bring him out with bag and baggage. *w/Barney*

✓ c) I've called Captain ROEMER in Region IV and he promised to keep us informed as soon as he has any new information. *by telephone*
to Captain SULLIVAN in ID and off the

✓d) I've double checked with Major SULLIVAN. His record kept him apprised of what we intended and hoped to do. He promised not to get the brass excited until we ~~REDACTED~~ have the MIG and the body. *good!*

e) I've informed MALEADY that if this case produces, my opinion of the Mr. PHIBRAM and his activities ~~is~~ definitely true.

opinion of the Mr. PRI
SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~JOIN MESSAGEFORM~~

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

ROUTING

25th 04
F. 8

REGRAD
COMBAT
EXERCISE

THE TERRITORY OF

33/10232

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)
CO, HQ 66th CIC DET, USAREUR
MR RISSINGER

TO: CO. CIC REGION IV, MUNICH

Reproduced ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of
Col. J. C. May Jr., USA, Commanding. Consult

PARAPETTEN- UND DACHGEBÄUDE
DO 49 AUSGABE 1. 1. 1938

INFO:

INFO: 15 AUG 1950
SUBJ SOV AIR FORCE COL CMM BADEN CMM AUSTRIA PD URMSG DOG DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE
DTD TWO NINE OCT CURR VIEWED WITH GREATEST INTEREST THIS HQ AND IS CONSIDERED HIGHEST
PRIORITY PD DESIRE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE OF SUBJ AND AUSTRIAN SINGER AFTER
SCHEDULED MEETING PRIOR ONE NOV CURR PD PROMISE LUCRATIVE ASYLUM WITH DELIVERY OF
MIG PD FOUR THREE ZERO CIC DET IS NOT RPT NOT TO BE CONTACTED AT THIS TIME PD CAREFUL
PLANNING AND TIMELINESS ESSENTIAL TO CLINCH DEAL PD PARAMOUNT THAT UR PLANS INCLUDE
SINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM SOV ZONE CMM AUSTRIA PRIOR SUBJ'S DESERTION WITH MIG PD IN
EVENT SUBJ CANNOT DELIVER MIG WHAT PLAN FORMULATED TRANSFER SUBJ FROM SOV ZONE AUSTRI
TO UNCLE SUGAR SANCTUARY QUERY FOL FACTORS REQUIRED IN PRIORITY SEQUENCE CMM FLEXIBLE
TO SITUATION CLN ONE PD INDUCE SUBJ TO ESCAPE WITH LATEST TYPE MIG AND LAND IN UNCLE
SUGAR ZONE CMM GERMANY PD TWO PD IF IMPOSSIBLE RECOMMEND HE BRING CONSTRUCTION PLANS
OF MIG PD THREE PD TAKE OBOE AND EASY DOCUMENTS PD FOUR PD ~~IMPORTANT~~ TECHNICAL MANUAL
AVAL TO SUBJ PD FIVE PD ABLE DASH TWO FILES IF OBTAINABLE PD SIX PD ANY OTHER DOCUMENT
SUBJ WOULD CONSIDER VALUABLE TO THE ENEMY PD RECOMMEND UR FILE COPY OF MESSAGE DOG
DASH TWO FIVE EIGHT THREE BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION
RECORDED BY HQ 6017 INFORMATION

Page

Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 SECURITY INFORMATION

OF THE STATE COMMUNITY N
6223

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RECORDED AND INDEXED
JAN 14 1997

68 OCT 14 1997

BY CLARK WILHELMSEN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM																												
ROUTING COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.																												
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COL. B.F. HQ 66th CIC DET.																												
CONFIDENTIAL																												
<small>SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY</small>																												
FROM: (Originator) CO, HQ 66th CIC DET., USAREUR MR RISSINGER																												
TO: CO, CIC REGION IV, MUNICH																												
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 2px;">DATE/TIME GROUP</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 2px;">300845 0c</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33.33%; padding: 2px;">PRECEDENCE FOR:</td> <td style="width: 33.33%; padding: 2px;">ACTION</td> <td style="width: 33.33%; padding: 2px;">INFORMATION</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;">PRIORITY</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE </td> <td style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;"> <input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS </td> <td style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;"> CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 2px; text-align: center;">REFERS TO MESSAGE:</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">IDENTIFICATION</td> <td colspan="2" style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">CLASSIFICATION</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="padding: 2px;">D-2583</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">Secret</td> </tr> </table>		DATE/TIME GROUP			300845 0c			PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION	PRIORITY			<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE		<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	REFERS TO MESSAGE:			IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION		D-2583		Secret
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<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS		CRYPTOPRECAUTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO																										
REFERS TO MESSAGE:																												
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION																											
D-2583		Secret																										

INFO:

CATION SERVES AS AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION PD RESULTS UR MEETING WITH AUSTRIAN SINGER
AT FREILASSING CMM GERMANY DESIRED THIS HQ MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS SOONEST PD CITE
RISSINGER SIGNED TORMEY

M/R: Self-explanatory. Coordinated with Majors MALEADY, GALLAGHER, ROSE 29 Oct 52. M/R

MLR

Any person is invited to per 45, SR 581-324-10, which prescribes that disclosure of the nature, source(s) or even the existence of such confidential intelligence information may be communicated in such a report or report, if such disclosure is not likely to be of value to the person to whom the information may be disclosed, provided that the disclosure is made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, by the Assistant Commissioner, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Disclosure of such information will be considered a violation of AR 581-10.

REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL. D. A. T. C. D. B.
HQ 66TH CIC DET, 165-125
17 NOV 52
Chase
165-125
SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy _____		RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DEFINITE NAME (and signature, where required) MARVIN L KISSINGER, DAC/jd		- 9 -
SYMBOL D-278482	TELEPHONE 344	OFFICIAL TITLE Chief Oper Sec
EXPIRES FROM 1 MAY 1968 RELEASER'S SIGNATURE		

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES FORM 120, 1 MAY 44
WHICH MAY BE USED.

→ AGL (1) 8-22-2000 000

REFRAGED

COL. B. A. TOMEY
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

66TH OQUITER INTELLIGENCE CORPS ELEMENT

CODE CLERK: JEFFRIES

A305
D-778482

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: ROEMER, REGION IV MUNICH

FOR ACTION: ROSE, HQS 66TH CIC DET US ARMY

TO: 290945Z OCT 52

TO: 291105Z OCT 52

FOR INFO:

REFERENCE MR: D-2583

PRIORITY

PAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

SUBJ SOVIET AIR FORCE COLONEL, BADEN NEAR VIENNA. REF CONVERSATION ROSE, RISSINGER, AND BAINWOL 27 OCT CURR. INTERROGATION OF 0-0123-IV INDICATED SUBJ MAIN PROBLEM IS HIS TRAVEL WESTWARD THROUGH SOVIET ZONE AUSTRIA. SUBJ PLANS TO DESERT WITH AN AUSTRIAN FEMALE SINGER NAME UNKNOWN. ARRANGED MEETING WITH SINGER BETWEEN SOURCE AND REGION IV AGENTS AT FREILASSING, GERMANY, ON AUSTRO-GERMAN BORDER WILL TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO 1 NOV CURR TO PRECLUDE DELAY OR FAILURE. SUBJ DEFECTION IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, IS MORE PROBABLE NECESSITATING COORDINATION WITH 430 CIC DET FOR AIR TRANS FORM VIENNA AND TRAVEL OF AGENTS BAINWOL AND PEDZORA TO VIENNA.

Regraged CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. J. Clay III by J.W.

on 19 AUG 1958 to Reg IV - 20 Oct 58

D-278482

Coordinated with Major Malady
Fitzgerald & Rose 29 Oct 52

HQ's 66th TSC Log No.
H-6229

CONFIDENTIAL

10

REFRAGED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL. B. A. TOMEY, BY J. CLAY III
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

REFRAGED BY AUTHORITY OF
COL. B. A. TOMEY, BY J. CLAY III
HQ 66TH CIC DET.

Page 1 of 1 Pages
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66TH COMINT INTELLIGENCE CORPS DEPARTMENT

INCOMING MESSAGE

CALL SIGN: SHER

MSG ID: YF XW!

FROM: CIC LIAISON OFFICE HEIDELBERG

PGO: 221255Z SEPT 52

FOR ACTION: CO, HQ 66TH CIC DET, USAREUR

TOR: 221326Z SEPT 52

FOR INFO: G-2 SEVENTH ARMY

PLEASE NOT REQUIRED
SIXTH COMINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FOR DECLASSIFYING

REFERENCE NR:

M-4326

~~PRIORITY~~

11 INFORMATION FROM PRAGUE REPORTS RECURRENT RUMOR PAST FEW DAYS SOVIET MARSHAL KONEV TOGETHER WITH EIGHT MEMBERS HIS RUSSIAN STAFF HAVE ESCAPED. RUMOR GIVEN SOLE CREDENCE BY CANCELLATION ON OR ABOUT 10 SEPTEMBER ALL RESERVATIONS AND CEREMONY SCHEDULED 13 SEPTEMBER WHEN CERTAIN MINES AND OTHER FACILITIES KLABNO WERE TO BE DESIGNATED KONEV WORKS. ESCAPE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED IN KARLOVY AREA WHERE KONEV AND PARTY WERE TO TAKE THE BATHS. REQUEST HANDLING AGENTS AND BORDER STATIONS BE ALERTED THIS RUMOR WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS SUBJECT. IN EVENT LEAD OBTAINED TO SUBSTANTIATE RUMOR OR APPEARANCE ANY OR ALL DEFECTORS THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST. HANDLING SHOULD BE EXPEDITED. 11

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
66th COMINT by CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
on 19 AUG 1993

*Caro & Jit
D 278 487
John C*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON OCT 14 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-503 DoD 5200.2-R

1 of 2 copies
2 of 2 copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 11

Marshall, I. S. Konev. Accompanied Mrs Gorbacheva on
receiving stand on 9 May 52 Military Parade, Peking
RD-306529/0 WDCS Inst Rep Ord 3 Jun 52

KONEV, Ivan Stepanovich born 1897 Arkhangelsk
Marshall - Page Minister of General Jones. Commanding
of Ground forces. RD 242488 S.I.D. 1st May 48 (Aug 47)

Konev, Jm.

For Marshall - Minister to CEPICKA, Minister Defense
RD-169571 VII 23 Aug 57 CMB OB

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING:

MESSAGE FORM

COMPUTER FILED

No. 66th CIC Detachment

F-8146

SPACE ABOVE RESERVED FOR CACI TEL. ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

HQ 66TH CIC DETACHMENT

TO: CO, ALL CIC REGIONS EXCEPT REGION IX

INFO: Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of Col. J. C. Clow III cy 100

on 19 AUG 1958

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ITEM DOG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION GLN QUOTE INFORMATION FROM PRAGUE REPORTS RECURRENT RUMOR PAST FEW DAYS SOVIET MARSHAL KONEV TOGETHER WITH EIGHT MEMBERS HIS RUSSIAN STAFF HAVE ESCAPED PD RUMOR GIVEN SOME CREDENCE BY CANCELLATION EN OR ABOUT ONE ZERO SEPTEMBER ALL RESERVATIONS AND CEREMONY SCHEDULED ONE THREE SEPTEMBER WHEN CERTAIN MINES AND OTHER FACILITIES KLAIDNO WERE TO BE DESIGNATED KONEV WORKS PD ESCAPE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED IN KARLOVY VARY WHERE KONEV AND PARTY WERE TO TAKE THE BATHS PD REQUEST HANDLING AGENTS AND BORDER STATIONS BE ALERTED THIS RUMOR WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS SUBJECT PD IN EVENT LEAD OBTAINED TO SUBSTANTIATE RUMOR OR APPEARANCE ANY OR ALL DEFECTORS THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST PD HANDLING SHOULD BE EXPEDITED PD END UNQUOTE END CITE MALREADY

SIGNED TORMKY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON OCT 14 1997

BY CDR USAINECOM FO/P

13 OF 13 PAGES OF PAGES

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature when rec'd) CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTER'S SIGNATURE
EUGENE L. MALREADY, MAJOR, TC

SYMBOL

CICR

TELE. NO.

OFFICIAL TITLE

CHIEF, OPERATIONS SECTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(a)(1) + (b)(3) For CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 14-26

HEADQUARTERS
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742 [REDACTED] US Army

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 April 1951

SUBJECT : Progress Report

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
by W

19 AUG 1958

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September 1950, ^{On 10 Sept 1952} Subject: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL). ^{(b) (6)}

2. All contacts and leads reported in previous reports are still being exploited and followed up in an attempt to defect Soviet military and civilian personnel. Exceptions to this are the cases of [] and [] mentioned in paragraph 4 of report dated 18 January 51 and [] mentioned in paragraph 5 of report dated 18 January 51. It has been determined, through East zone police sources, that [] is being held for serious political crimes. No trace of [] has been found. [] through the indiscretion of his fiancee [] was arrested in Neu-Ruppin by the Soviets. In an attempt to save their necks both [] and [] agreed to assist in the luring of our contact agent into the Soviet sector. This was to be accomplished thru the ruse of telling him they had the Soviet Lieutenant waiting in a cafe just across the sector boundary from Wedding (French Sector). Our agent, the contact with [] was to accompany [] in her car to the supposed rendezvous. The route led thru a small portion of the Soviet sector. Both [] and [] were arrested by West Berlin police but no actual proof against them could be produced and they were released. At an interrogation by our people [] practically admitted the above was true. Both are now afraid to return to the Soviet zone and are still in Berlin.

3. German Agent [] mentioned in paragraph 7 of report of 18 January 51, has finally promised the defection of Soviet [] stationed in AUE, on 28 May 51. In view of past experiences in such cases this office (b)(6) will consider it authentic when [] is delivered into our hands in Berlin.

4. Contact has been established with a person, who, allegedly, was a white Russian Emigre to France and was forceably repatriated to the Soviets following the close of World War II. He ended up in Frankfurt am/Oder as Technical Engineer for Soviet Department "KETCH" and is, allegedly, responsible for all military construction in the Sovzone, East of Berlin. He is alleged to desire to defect and has expressed a wish to return to France. This case was with you by Lt Colonel Lerette at the time of his last visit to ID, EUCOM. German agent, ~~is~~ a singer in the city opera in Frankfurt am/Oder is the "go between" and ~~is~~ due in Berlin on ~~15~~ April 51 for further negotiations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7880 MID

B-148

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6)

5. Contact has also been established with a Soviet Captain, known to agent only as [] in Glau, bei Trebbin. This officer is supposed to be a teacher on the staff of Army "Funk and Nachrichten Dienst School in Glau. Contact man is a german barber named [] who is working at his profession in the military Kaserne in Glau. According to [] so (2) soviet Majors and twelve (12) enlisted men from the school staff were arrested recently for failure to carry out their duties and were accused of sabotage. Allegedly, the captain fears he will also be arrested and, with [] assistance, will take advantage of 1 May 51 festivities and general laxness to defect to the Americans in Berlin.

(b)(6)

6. Through the Indian Mission here in Berlin our agent met an Indian National, Sitharan, who has been doing some business with the Soviet Trade Mission. Some time ago our agent was able to meet his girl friend, Annemaria Schuster, who works as a translator for the Soviets in Karlshorst and in the evenings teaches soviet officers the german language. She is in contact with a major [] who has expressed to her his desire to defect to the West. Sitharan remains the contact between our agent and Schuster. She, allegedly, is to render her assistance out of idealism while, unknown to her, Sitharan will collect the reward.

7. Through a mutual acquaintance our agent was able to meet Dr TRUSCHNOWITSCH, the chief of the Committee for Greek Orthodox Refugees, located at 13 Giesler Strasse, Berlin-Wilmersdorf. Dr TRUSCHNOWITSCH was very cooperative and promised to let us have "first crack" at any military defectees he might come up with and to turn over to us any leads which he couldn't properly exploit. He states that he is in contact with several potential defectees but had only gotten one actual defector since January 51, a former soldier who had civilianized and was working as a bookkeeper in Magdeburg. In return for his cooperation we have promised him limited assistance in receiving relief parcels from the states, housing permits and interzonal passes. Our assistance will depend on the amount of his cooperation.

8. Since 1 March 51 this organization has initiated a project of seeking out names and addresses of persons in the East zone who are known to have close contact with the soviets or an individual soviet. In this connection notices are sent to these individuals under the name of "Internationales Hilfswerk" informing them that a relief package was been received in Berlin intended for delivery to them. Pick up must be made in Berlin. Some 20 such notices have been sent out and to date four (4) have appeared to claim their packages. One of these was [] a waitress in an officer's mess just outside of Eberswalde. She has already returned one time and gave us additional names of girls who were keeping company with soviet officers or soldiers. Her sister was the former girl friend of Soluschenko who deserted in 1949. She is to accompany the military unit on maneuvers in the Templin Area maneuvers but will return to Berlin on 2 May 51.

9. Further developments will be reported as they occur.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

28

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major
Control Officer

OCT 14 1997

BY CDR USAV/CDR USARP
Auth Per 3-603 DoD 5220, 1-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742
US Army

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. Clay H. W.
on 15 AUG 1958
SUBJECT: Progress Report

18 January 1951

D-78482

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TCP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.C9 (GID/CFS/OCIB).

2. Last report required by above referred to letter was submitted on 18 December 1950.

3. All contacts and leads reported in previous reports are still being negotiated, in an attempt to defect Soviet personnel. As of this report no defectors have actually arrived at this Headquarters.

4. A young woman, C, living in East Berlin and working professionally as a prostitute, was recently contacted through a German black marketeer, known as C and was recruited for the defector program. She regularly visits a Soviet Major, C, in Potsdam. On the occasion of these visits she was taken secretly into his quarters. On 10 January 1951 she was scheduled to meet Onegov in Potsdam, but upon her arrival at the Bahnhof in Potsdam a German messenger from Onegov informed her that he was working and couldn't see her, however, he would come to her house in East Berlin the following week. On Tuesday evening she contacted C saying that Onegov had been at her house and had gone on to Pankow where he would wait and that she should bring him, C with her in order that Onegov could be better oriented as to what would happen to him in the event he defected. In this connection he asked that she meets him in Pankow with C who was to give him the picture. Both, C and C were driven to an S-Bahn station near the Pankow border and were sent in a Taxi to Pankow. Neither have been heard from since nor have they returned to their homes in the East sector.

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ON OCT 14 1997
BY 7880 MID
With Pmt 1003 Rev 5200 1-4
B-106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. A German Engineer, Imhoff, living in the West sector, is engaged to a woman doctor Stiehl in Neu-Ruppin. Dr. Stiehl has been treating a Soviet Lieutenant for Venerial Disease and has been asked by this Lieutenant as to how he could best defect to the West. On 4 January 1951, Imhoff was sent to Neu-Ruppin to pick up the Lieutenant and bring him to Berlin. He expected to be back not later than 8 January 1951. Imhoff has not returned nor has he been heard from since his departure. A report was received by this unit that two (2) Soviet officers, a Major and a Lieutenant, had disappeared from Neu-Ruppin on 16 January 1951 and that the Soviets were turning the town "inside out" an attempt to locate them. It is quite possible that the Lieutenant is the officer for whom Imhoff was sent and that they will eventually all three (3) turn up in Berlin. *552 (b) 6*

6. A doctor, practicing in Fberswalde, has given us the name and an address of a German girl, C who had infected two (2) Soviet officers with a venereal disease. The doctor had effected cures in all three (3) cases and informed us that now one of the Soviets was very desirous of marrying Klaebsch. The doctor desires to have nothing, whatsoever, to do with defecting Soviet personnel. On 12 January 1951 an agent was sent to contact Klaebsch. She was seen by this agent entering her house but before he could make contact with her, a Soviet officer entered the house and remained for over two (2) hours. Due to train schedules agent had to leave without making contact. New attempts are being made to exploit this case. *6*

7. C a resident agent living in Aue, attempted to defect Soviet Captain C. Plans were all made toward their departure on the evening of 11 January 1951. Report received is that Petrenkov had discussed his defection with another Soviet officer, known only as "Sascha", and that Sascha had reported his imminent defection. C was arrested and C fled to Berlin. A friend of C living in Aue, brought his personal items and clothes to him and reported that another Soviet friend of his, Major Gravchenko, had visited her after C flight and, reportedly, expressed a desire to defect. C has agreed to go to Chernitz provided he is furnished a different Identification pass. There he would meet, at a prearranged time and place, Gravchenko, and bring him to Berlin. A new Identification pass is being furnished Schubert and he plans to leave Berlin on or about 25 January 1951. *6*

6 (b) (6)

8. Two (2) sisters C and C working in Soviet General Depot # 399 in Bernau have been contacted and propositioned. Both have many contacts with Soviet personnel and occasionally date Soviet soldiers. Anna has agreed to come to Berlin for more definite talks. *30*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. Concrete results obtained from the defector program have, so far, been somewhat disappointing. Many direct contacts have already been established with prospective Soviet defectees and the program itself is being aggressively pursued.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Charles A. Murphy
CHARLES A. ~~1~~
Major Inf.
Control Officer

3
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BY CDR USMILCOM FOR 2000
Auth Per 1-503 DOD 5200.2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 742

D-778482

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of
W.C. Clay Jr. by J.W.

18 December 1950

on 19 AUS SUBJECT : Progress Report

Noted

WCP

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL).
E-1355
E-1704
E-1650

2. Initial report required by letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, was submitted on 17 November, 1950.

3. All Contacts reported in November under the above-cited directive are being aggressively pushed toward completion. "Willie", the proprietor of a restaurant in the DESSAU area mentioned in in-closure 1 to TOP SECRET Letter, your Hq, dated 13 November 1950, has been contacted and invited to BERLIN for consultation. A good chance exists that he will arrive during the holidays.

1 of EBERSWALDE is still working in 82nd Regimental Officer's Mess there. She also is to come to BERLIN for a meeting. Charlotte SCHAUER has been located but not yet contacted.

4. A tenor singer of the City Opera in Frankfurt, known personally to our agent through his sister living in BERLIN, claims to know several Soviet Officers personally, including one (1) Lieutenant who wants to defect. He has promised to deliver him during the Christmas holidays. The singer is cautiously feeling out other Soviets to ascertain any additional potential defectors. The only other developed lead is through a sub-agent who is supposed to have left BERLIN Monday 18 December 1950 with intent to return Thursday, 21 December 1950, with a Soviet Defector.

5. In the implementation of directive referred to in par 1, above, this organization in addition to developing those leads furnished by ID, EUCOM, and those already on hand, has established contacts in West Berlin Organizations and institutions where East Germans normally report, such as RIAS, American Consulate, and Newspaper offices, with a view towards referral of possible contacts to us for development.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

32

Oct 14 1952
CDR USAREUR FO 100-1503 000 6200 1-2
CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major
Control Officer

REG NO ECGID-10E186
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BY AUTHORITY OF Commanding General, USAREUR
BY Name

7880 MIL
B-88

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REF ID: A65104~~
 HEADQUARTERS
 7880 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
 APO 742
 US ARMY

D 78482

Reproduced CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col. Class II by J.W.

17 November 1950

on 19 NOV 1950 SUBJECT : Progress Report

TO : Director of Intelligence, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army
 ATTN : Colonel Hardick

1. Reference TOP SECRET Letter, ID, EUCOM, dated 21 September, 1950, Subject: Potential Operational Leads for defecting Soviet Military Personnel, file 350.09 (GID/OPs/COLL).

2. Above cited directive was received by this organization on 26 September 1950. On 28 September a field grade officer, in addition to his other duties, was assigned to work on this project and on 13 November this officer was relieved of all other duties and charged specifically with carrying out the directive outlined in above cited directive. (b)(6)

3. As of this report only one of the operational leads, furnished in referenced letter, has been run down. A waitress in an officers mess in Eberswalde, has been contacted and informed our agent that both Gromada and Solushchenko had been returned to the Soviet Union. A special effort is being made to penetrate DOM No. 9 in BERNAU and also to establish contact with Suyetov, Comptroller for the 399 Depot, also located in Bernau. To date, no concrete results have been obtained. (b)(6)

4. In addition to those leads furnished in subject directive, definite contact has been established with the following Soviet Personnel:

1. Is located in Luckenwalde, a staff officer of the Third Guards Army. Informant states subject officer is in charge of commissary and Post Exchange sales and distribution. Contact was made through a former female friend who fled Luckenwalde about a month ago. She had worked in the army commissary and was connected with a discrepancy in the sales accounts. She is now living in West Berlin without permission of the authorities and without funds. She claimed that she and Kordleff had discussed his not returning to the Soviet Union and seemed sincere in her belief that she needed only to contact him to have him come to Berlin. She outlined a very circuitous plan to our agent which she was going to use to establish contact and bring said officer into West Berlin. Prospects of his actual defection appear to be quite good. 33 (b)(6)

2. Is located in Eberswalde, a staff officer of the Fourth Guards Army. Contact was established through a Latvian underground operating in the Soviet Zone with

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OCT 1 1950

7880 MID
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 223

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 BY AUTHORITY OF
 BY Colonel Hardick
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 COPY 1 OF 2

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
SUGGEST
a cell in Berlin. The member of the underground with whom our agent is working states that his people have discussed [redacted] defection with him and that he definitely desired to leave. On one occasion, a female was sent to Berlin from Eberswalde for the alleged purpose of making certain that it was the Americans and not the French or British who was to receive defector. Contact with the underground's Berlin representative has been found to be difficult and irregular by reason of his frequent trips into the East Zone. This case, at times, does not appear to be completely bonafide and is being handled very cautiously by our agent. Prospects of obtaining subject officer as defector cannot be ascertained at this time.

(b)(6)

J (Last Name Unknown) - Is located in Potsdam, a staff officer of some military unit. A female, with whom he has carried on an affair over the past four (4) years is our contact. She divulged subject officer's intent not to return to the Soviet Union to our agent. At the meeting she refused to tell his last name or his exact staff position, saying that he held number two spot on the staff concerned. She also stated that he had intended to defect in 1946 but that she had dissuaded him because of the possibility of his being turned back. The female friend plans a visit with this officer in the very near future and has assured our agent that she will bring him into West Berlin to "talk things over". She requested a guarantee of assurance that, if he so desired, he would be permitted to return to Potsdam. Developments in this case would tend to reflect very good prospects of subject's defection.

5. Most of the leads furnished in letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, are being followed up and several other new ones are being exploited but are not yet sufficiently developed to be included in this report.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Charles A. Murphy
CHARLES A. MURPHY
Major Inf
Control Officer

ON OCT 14 1962
By CDR USA, S-1, G-2, C-PO
Auth Pika 1-603 Doc 52004 14

TOP SECRET
SAC

25X.00 (07/17/59/07/59)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

23 November 1950

b1+b3
for CIA

1. D/Int [] 23 Nov 50

1. Reference is made to our Top Secret ~~TM~~, basic
subject, dated 23 August 1950, and to your reply of 5
September 1950.

2. Pursuant to procedure which evolved from the re-
ferenced correspondence, there is enclosed herewith a
carbon copy of material from one additional interrogation
on the subject, along with a copy of our letter to 7880th
MID in Berlin forwarding the same material and instructing it
then to coordinate the exploitation of any leads with []
on the Berlin level.

b1+b3
CIA

3. Your reply that this arrangement is still satis-
factory will be appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Incl: 1/
W/Ref 101 8074

V. L. HARTIGER
Col GSC
Chief, Collection Section

M/R: Referenced correspondence is in TSC Folder "Operational Leads for Defection
of Sov Mil Personnel" E-1235 and E-1299. Referenced material is excerpts
from interrogation of PIVICHENKO (PIR-170), 27 Oct 50 TSC Reg #E-1578, also
in same folder.

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BY AUTHORITY OF Screening Board
BY Concurrent with EAC-6 Dec 52

Note Grade Date

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Page(s) 36-53

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

D-278482
APC 403

21 September 1950

350.09 (OID/OPS/COLL)

SUBJECT: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting
Soviet Military Personnel

TO: Commanding Officer
7880 MI Detachment
APO 742, US Army

1. Herewith are carbon copies of the following correspondence:

a. IRS from this Division to [] basic subject, 25 August 1950, forwarding potential operational leads for the defection of Soviet military personnel, as obtained from Soviet deserters interrogated at ECYC. (b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

b. Inclosures to the above-cited IRS, namely:

(1) Copy of SRI 347-50

(2) Excerpts from ECYC letter replies to SRI 347-50, Subject: "Desertion Motives and the KIS", dated as follows:

(a) 9 May 1950 on PIR-156 []
(b) 19 June 1950 on PIR-158 []
(c) 22 June 1950 on PIR-157 []
(d) 24 April 1950 on PIR-150 []
(e) 26 July 1950 on PIR-159 []
(f) 25 July 50 on PIR-161 [] (b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

c. Letter to this Division [] basic subject, 5 September 1950, in reply to basic IRS, authorising and suggesting that these leads be sent to 7880th MID for exploitation. (b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

d. Request that you establish or energize a system to attempt the exploitation of as many as practicable of the potential leads in this material for the purpose of inducing the defection of all possible Soviet military personnel. As is outlined in the attached correspondence, your activities in this direction are to be coordinated. (b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

CLASSIFICATION BY AUTHORITY OF Commanding General
BY Commanding General, US Army
BY Commanding General, US Army

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~~SECRET~~

350.09 (CID/OPS/COll)

SUBJ: Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet Military Personnel

21 Sept 1950

WEP/NLH/MSJ WEP/HY

IS CONTROL

3. It is felt that the German personnel mentioned in the attached reports are of high potential value in making contacts with Soviet personnel, and that a definite program should be established for contacting each of them. It is also desired, of course, that the Soviet military personnel be contacted if possible.

4. Letter requests should be submitted for any additional funds necessary for this project.

5. It is also requested that you submit a monthly progress report, Top Secret, basic subject, to reach this Division on the 20th of each month beginning 20 November 1950.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

(b)(6)

Incls: a/s
Tel: Heid Mil 8074

Colonel GSC
Chief, Collection Section

5 USC 552 (b) (3)
for C/7

COORD: Col Lt Col Maj Capt J

(b)(6)

55
56

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D-78482

350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

25 August 1950

AM/ADM E/RY/IRW/SEN

1. D/Int 25 Aug

2. This Division is interested in attempting to in-
1950 due the desertion of more Soviet military personnel.3. This IIM is written to effect the operational
coordination which it is felt will bring the best results, and to comply with the pro-
visions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 13, "Exploitation of
Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States", dated 19 January 1950.4. Attached hereto are all pertinent excerpts from
interrogation reports of Soviet military defectors, received from ECIC in answer to our
SRI 347-50. Attached also, for your information, is a copy of SRI 347-50. As you will
see, only certain parts of it contribute potential leads for defecting Soviet military
personnel; those parts have been extracted for purposes of this paper, but the entire
reports are available to you for study or copying whenever you desire them.5. It is believed that the individuals who might be
induced to defect as the result of exploitation of these leads are of the "low-level"
type in which you are not primarily interested. They are Soviet military personnel,
however, and as such are of high interest to us, even though they may be only Privates
or low-ranking NCOs.

5. []

6. In the belief that our exploitation of the leads
in which you are not interested is, in the long run, in the interest of efficiency, this
division desires to undertake the inducing of the defection of Soviet military person-
nel who might be contacted through the information contained in the attached material.7. It is requested, therefore, that you review the
attached material with the idea of releasing to this division as many as possible of
the operational leads contained therein. In addition to the Soviets mentioned in the
reports, it is desired that you indicate your interest or disinterest in exploiting
the contact potentialities of the Germans listed in the reports.8. It is also requested that this division be kept
informed of the successful results of exploitation of any leads from this material, if
any is used by your organization.

(b)(6)

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J. 6/26. 1950
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50-07 (CID/OPS/COLL)
Potential Operational Leads for Defecting Soviet
Military Personnel

25 August 1950

5 USC 552 (b) (3)
Exemptions for C.I.A.

9. It is tentatively planned by this Division that
the 7880th MID will be given the released information for exploitation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

(b)(6)

Incls: Copy of SSI 347-50

Excerpts from ECIC Ltrs.

9 May 50 on PIR-156, TSC ~~FE-681~~
19 June 50 on PIR-158, TSC ~~FE-852~~
22 June 50 on PIR-157, TSC ~~FE-861~~
24 April 50 on PIR-150, TSC ~~FE-572~~
26 July 50 on PIR-159, TSC ~~FE-1077~~
27 July 50 on PIR-161, TSC ~~FE-103~~
(All subjs: "Desertion Notices
and the RIS")

Lt Col ~~COL~~
Chief, Coll Sec

Tel: Held 241 0074

W/R: The above information has been collected and studied since April and
it is now believed that this type information is of sufficient value to
warrant exploitation. This IRS is the first step in evolving an SCP for the
exploitation of all such future leads obtained.

57

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Page(s) 58-88

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hq 7707 ECIC, 19 Jun 50, subj: Desertion Motives and the RIS

Source does not know who censors the mail from the USSR. He says that the censorship stamps on mail received in his unit bore widely different numbers but he does not recall what they were or what they designated. He believes mail from his unit was censored by a censorship unit near JUETERBOG (the only such unit he knows of in the Soviet Zone of Germany). At this location, he observed Russian women in officers' and non-commissioned officers' uniforms and heard that they worked for the censorship unit. He knows no further details.

Soviet personnel may send photographs in their letters but they are not allowed to write the location of their unit, its name or number, their branch of service, TO or T/E data, the name of the commanding officer, anything concerning the type or quantity of food served, complaints of any kind, or anything derogatory to the Soviet army, the Soviet government, or to Communism.

Censurable material is blacked out. Source never heard of any penalties for infraction of censorship rules. Soviet personnel may not send mail to Germans or receive mail from them.

24. What security functions are exercised by the city Kommandanturas in the Soviet Zone, with regard to: (a) Soviet Army personnel; (b) German population; (c) foreign travelers?

The Kommandantura patrols checked papers of Soviet Army personnel in public places and entered cinemas and restaurants to see whether Soviet Army personnel were present. The patrols exercised no controls over the German population except to arrest malefactors detected, *flagrante delicto*. Source does not know what control the Kommandantura exercises over foreigner travelers inasmuch as he was not aware of their being any travelers in the Soviet Zone.

25. What secret document section do you know of? Did your unit have one? Do you know what was kept there? Who is in charge of it? Who are the couriers for secret documents? Did you ever handle secret documents? If so, describe your duties.

(b)(6)

Source says that each regiment and division had a secret documents section which filed secret papers and orders. Sergeant [redacted] was in charge of the secret documents section of the 22nd Regiment and a captain (name unknown), and Sergeant Major [redacted] were in charge of the divisional section. These sections were located in the headquarters building of the regiment and the division. [redacted] was regimental courier for secret documents. Source does not know who was the divisional courier and never handled secret documents himself.

Page 11 of 12 pages

Copy 2 of 5 copies

89

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ON 19 SEP 2000
BY USAMNSCOM FOIA/P
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b) (1) + (b) (3) For CIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page 1 90

16 June 1950

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirement No. M- 159

FROM : Chief, Analysis Branch, (Military Section, Requirements Desk)

TO : Chief, Operations Branch (Attn: Collection Section, O/B Desk)

1. References: Top Secret Letter from Eq, 7707 ECIC to CO, 66 CIC Det., Subj: "Potential Soviet Deserter, dtd 8 Jun 50.
2. Suspense date: 1 July 1950. Unsatisfied portions of requirement (xxxx) are not desired after suspense date. Answer (is) (xxxx) required on OCS Form 17.
3. The requirement:

Request that ECIC be instructed to determine through interrogation of GROMOV (PIR-166) what additional information, if any, might be expected by interrogation of Private BLOVCHENKO, former aide to GROMOV.

This information is desired before serious consideration is given to inducing desertion of BLOVCHENKO.

CARL A. WEAVER
Lt Col GSC
Ch, Mil Sect

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 10 Oct 97
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Screening Board
Carteray Smith, 6/26-8/Dec 52
Date

91

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Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 92 - 122

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL)

AP 0403
13 April 1950

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION NUMBER: SIK 347-50

SUBJECT: Brief on Deserter Motives and on Role.

TO: The Commanding Officer

7707 ECIC
APO 797, US Army

1. It is desired that ten Soviet deserters, regardless of unit or previous association with the Russian Intelligence Service, be interrogated in accordance with the attached brief, as follows:

a. Interrogate the following as soon as practicable:

⑥ (1) (PIR-156)
(2) (PIR-157)
(3) (PIR-158)
(4) (PIR-159)
(5) (PIR-161)

b. Interrogate the next five Soviet deserters who arrive at ECIC.

2. As complete an answer as may be procurable must reach this division by 16 June 1950. If no information has been forwarded to reach this office by that date, negative answer (written or telephonic) is required by that date. OCS Form 17 will not be used in answering the requirement.

3. All replies to the requirement will make specific reference to Control Number: SIK 347-50.

4. FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

1 Incls

2/8

C

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ON 19 SEPT 2000
BY USAINS/SCOM FOUMA
Amh Part 4 102 DOD 5200.1R

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(Classification)

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: V-10231

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Deserters

DATE: 3 March 1950

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly
draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	To	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?	
1	Hqs. Region 66th CIC V	3 Mar 50 Attn: FILE		<p>1. Forwarded herewith Agent Report, Subject, file and date as above, for your information.</p> <p>2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:</p> <p>a. Source of Information: Border Police in PASSAU.</p> <p>b. Method by which Information was Obtained: Information relayed to reporting Agent by Source.</p> <p>c. Chain of Sources and Sub-Sources: <u> </u> <u> </u>, to Border Police PASSAU to agent.</p> <p>d. Evaluation and name of Each: <u> </u> evaluated "F". Border Police, evaluated "C".</p> <p>e. Position of Source in Relation to Target: As stated in Agent's Report.</p> <p>f. Date of Information: 25 February 1950.</p> <p>g. Date Information reported by Source: 25 February 1950.</p> <p>FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:</p> <p><u> </u> <u> </u></p>	
				INCL: <u>AR</u> , a/s (3)	LOG NO. <u>144779</u>
				DIST: 3 - Hqs. 66th CIC Det. 1 - Region V files	
				(b)(6) <u> </u> /Regensburg 7-259/ext 1	

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124

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(Classification)

(over)

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TAR/vgs

AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Soviet Deserters

2. DATE SUBMITTED

3 March 1950

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

V-10231

5 USC 552

(b) (6)

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

- At 2200 hours on Saturday, 25 February 1950, Border Police Headquarters, PASSAU (N49/Q21), notified the undersigned that they had just received word from Josef KHNLE, Chief of the Border Police, Landkreis WEGSCHEID, that two Soviet soldiers had deserted from URFahr, Austria, and supposedly were headed for the Austrian border. The names of the two deserters were given as [] and []
- Information received on 26 February 1950 from the Border Police Headquarters, PASSAU, revealed that they had neither seen nor apprehended anyone answering the description of the above named individuals during the previous night. (F-3)
- AGENT'S NOTES: In the past Soviet deserters have been reported to the Border Police, but during the past several months none have managed to reach Bavaria unless stationed in the immediate border vicinity, as distance and risk of capture is too great.

APPROVED:

GLENN E. FRANKS
Team Commander
CE Team

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ON 19 SEP 2007
BY USAINSCOM FOIA/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

125

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

THOMAS A. RHODES, S/A, 66th CIC Detachment
Region V, REGensburg

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

WD 140 FORM 1 JUN 47 341

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 60-10-58407-1

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D-238470

Desertion of Four (4) Soviet Officers

12 January 1950

Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of

Col. G. Clay Jr. by W. W.

19 AUG 1958

on

(C) (7) (c)

1 Eqs CO CIC 12 Jan
68th Reg 50
CIC IX
Det X
III

Zone of Germany, arriving there on or about 23 November 1949.

1. Information received indicates that four (4) Soviet officers deserted from the Transient Camp at MEISSEN (Saxony) about 17 November 1949 and made their way via CHEMNITZ to the BRAUNSCHWEIG-RINGELHEIM area in the British

to the BRAUNSCHWEIG-RINGELHEIM area in the British

are as follows:

2. Descriptions of two (2) of the officers

(C) (7) (c)

a. , fmu: Height about 5'; slim; broad shoulders; narrow waist. Apparent age about 38. Light brown wavy hair combed straight back. Normal ears, flat. Blue eyes of medium size. Bushy eyebrows. A rather pointed chin, not cleft. Upper second tooth (side not known) covered with yellow metal. Hollow cheeks. Weatherbeaten complexion, brownish. Upright carriage. Rather flat-footed gait. May be wearing double-breasted suit of thickish weave, with red lines about 1 cm wide crossing to form 3 cm squares on a light brown background. May be wearing officers' black boots under trousers and a leather jacket over suit.

(b) (6)

b. , fmu: Height about 5' 6"; stout; broad shoulders; pot belly; apparent age about 38. Hair turning grey from chestnut brown, bald on top. Small ears. Inconspicuous small eyes and eyebrows. Broad face; receding chin melts into neck. A "piggish" face. Normal teeth, clean. Sallow complexion. Upright carriage short-stepped rolling gait. May be wearing single-breasted suit of same material as SOKOLOV's. May be wearing a grey neck-high pullover and ordinary shoes.

(b) (6)

3. state that Subjects have not been located and that it appears they may have proceeded to the US Zone of Germany. It is requested that this office be notified if any of Subjects should come to your attention.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL ERSKINE:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 14 Sep 1987
BY USAINSCOM FO/PA
Auth Parz 4-102 DOD 5200.1K

Capt PYLE/dw/Stgt 93483/ext 19
OPS

126

GEORGE L. WILSON
Major Inf
S-2/S-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76191

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

350.09 (CID/GPS/COLL)

AP0 403
3 January 1950

SUBJECT: Desertion of Four Soviet Officers

TO: 1. Asst. Chief of Staff, Q-2, Eq U.S. Constabulary, AP0 46
② Commanding Officer, 66 OIC Detachment, AP0 154

(C7P)

1. Information received [] indicates that four Soviet officers deserted from the Transient Camp at MEISSEN (Saxony) about 17 November 1949 and made their way via CHEMNITZ to the BRAUNSCHWEIG-RINGELHEIM area in the British Zone of Germany, arriving there on or about 23 November 1949.

2. Descriptions of two of the officers are as follows:

a. [] fmu. Height about 6'; slim; broad shoulders; narrow waist. Apparent age about 38. Light brown wavy hair combed straight back. Normal ears, flat. Blue eyes of medium size. Bushy eyebrows. A rather pointed chin, not cleft. Upper second tooth (side not known) covered with yellow metal. Hollow cheeks. Weatherbeaten complexion, brownish. Upright carriage. Rather flat-footed gait. May be wearing double-breasted suit of thickish weave, with red lines about 1 cm wide crossing to form 3 cm squares on a light brown background. May be wearing officers' black boots under trousers and a leather jacket over suit.

b. [] fmu. Height about 5'6"; stout; broad shoulders; pot belly; apparent age about 38. Hair turning grey from chestnut brown, bald on top. Small ears. Inconspicuous small eyes and eyebrows. Broad face; receding chin melts into neck. A "piggish" face. Normal teeth, clean. Sallow complexion. Upright carriage, short-stepped rolling gait. May be wearing single-breasted suit of same material as SOKOLOV's. May be wearing a grey neck-high pullover and ordinary shoes.

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(C)(1)(D)

3. [REDACTED] subjects have not been located and that it appears they may have proceeded to the U.S. Zone of Germany. It is requested that this office be notified if any of subjects should come to the attention of your organization. (b)(6)

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C-1 C-2
C-3 C-4

Tel: Heidi Mil 8135

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 19 SEPT 2000
BY USAMNSCOM FOIA
Auth Part 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

D-27848V
Soviet Deserter
Detained

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division
APO 402, US Army

350.09 (GID/A Br/Military)

28 Nov 49

SUBJECT: Soviet Deserter [] (b)(6)

TO: []

[]
(b)(7)(D)

Dear [] (b)(6)

We have a question pertaining to the interrogation of Senior Sergeant [] In the detailed interrogation report of 15 October he gives his unit throughout as the 2d Gds Hvy Tk "Bn", whereas in the initial interrogation he gave his unit as the 82 Gds Hvy Tank "Bn". Our O/B records show the 82nd to be the organic heavy tank unit of the 6 Gds Cadre Tank Division. We would appreciate your comment on this apparent numerical discrepancy between the two reports.

(b)(6)

Further, for your information we have reached the conclusion after long study, that [] information is to be treated with considerable reserve, especially as pertains to the date of the information. In reviewing the pros and cons of your possible explanations of his information, we are inclined to favor paragraph 3 a. -- that is, that he deserted at an earlier date. The case "against" this possibility (the fact that he had knowledge of the demobilisation of the Class of 1945) we feel can be explained by the fact that this demobilisation was very late in coming and that it was advertised and talked about and predicted for almost a year before it actually came to pass. Therefore he could well have had knowledge of it in 1948.

Other pieces of his information, particularly the very confused O/B given, in any event tend to shed an unfavorable light on the rest of his statements. For this reason we give very little weight to his use of the cadre nomenclature as it affects our present analysis of the status of cadre formations.

In this connection, you will notice in our GID AB that the latest vehicle number analysis still indicates approximate 50% strength in the cadre units.

With best personal regards to all of your crew,

Sincerely yours,

129

D 28.11
4

(b)(6)

AB: AB refers to interrogation of Sr. S. [] Major [] GAV [] file in [] deserter file.

4, 5, 6

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Intelligence Division

AP0 403

3 November 1949

J (b)(7)(D)

D-278482
J

(b)(6)

I am happy that we were able to adjust the [] matter to our mutual satisfaction. [] and [] of your office arrived at ECIO 24 October 1949 and spent several days talking to the [].

You mention one class of cases concerning which you do not feel you will be able to release full information, and with this thought I am in complete accord. There may likewise be certain individuals from time to time on whom we will not be in a position to give you information, for operational reasons, and I feel sure that you will appreciate the need for a mutual understanding of this sort. It is anticipated that such instances will occur very infrequently, if at all.

Please be assured of my desire for continuation of the spirit of friendly cooperation and confidence which we have enjoyed in the past.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

J
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

(b)(6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 19 SEPT 2000
BY USAINS COM FOIA
Auth Par 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

E/R: Draft of this ltr approved by []
10th Oct 49, TS #D2489 refers.

J 31 Oct 49 - ltr fr []

130

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED CHANGED TO []
MAJORITY OF CIC LTR 25 Aug 52 8232491

b) Carney, Michael W. 16-24 Sept 52

Name

Grade

Date

D-2639
3

278482

EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Director of Intelligence
APO 742, U.S. Army

September 1949

(b)(7)(D)

Dear [REDACTED] (b) (7) (D)

(b)(6) which you called to my
attention in your letter of 31 August 1949, file number
HQ INT DIV/S/PP. 56644.

When [] first came into our control, interrogation revealed that he had possibilities for use as an agent against the Soviets. Information concerning him was therefore given very limited distribution pending an investigation concerning the advisability of using him in this manner. As you will readily understand, [] value operationally would be appreciably decreased by a widespread dissemination of any information concerning his contact with our intelligence people.

After he had been in our custody for a sufficient "cooling off" period to enable Soviet interest in him to wane, a more liberal distribution of the reports was made at which time you were forwarded the reports. At that time, he was to be used in the very near future on a special mission; hence, our statement that he no longer was available for interrogation.

Circumstances arising since our communication have obviated the use of [] on this project. He is therefore available for interrogation by your representatives, and we will release him to you if you so desire. I have advised my staff that in future cases of this type your Headquarters will be advised of all defectors and deserters even though they are to be used operationally.

131

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ON 19 SEP 2020
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Pare 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

D. TSC
D-2097
4

Information concerning individuals who are to be used as agents must be treated with utmost security, and I ask your assistance and cooperation in this respect. If the mission is immediate, as was contemplated in this case, the individual may not be available for your interrogation for a certain period.

I am sorry that our actions in this matter were a source of concern to you and am very grateful for your frank statements concerning them. I assure you of my complete confidence in our full mutual exchange of information, and I trust that this letter will remove any lack of confidence therein that may have arisen in your mind.

Sincerely,

Maj. Gen. USAF
Director of Intelligence

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 19 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FO/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Derive Patorial D-278482

350.09 (OID/OPS/IS)

(b)(6)

18 August 1949

(b)(7)(D)

DD/ID 18 Aug

49

(b)(6)

1. Forwarded for your information, per requests from , and , are the inclosed interrogation reports on (alias), Soviet deserter, who was formerly a 1st Lieutenant in the MGB.

2. These reports were not previously forwarded to your office since they contained operational leads which had to be checked. Subject is no longer available for further interrogation. It is requested that these reports and the identity of the subject be handled with the greatest possible security, and dissemination be limited as much as possible.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

13 Incls:

Report Nos:

1. K-1/35-49 ID DUCOM--1 copy
2. RT-4-49 (FIR-20)--ECIC--5 copies
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1 Lt Col, GSC
Chief, Control Branch

(S) 13 (b)(7)(D)

1 file

4 C/R

5 d.d.

MM/WD/Held M11-8135

(b)(1) 6 USC 552 (b) (3) for CIA

Coordinated with

M/R May Miller, USDO, and Capt

D-1770

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(b)(6)

D-1776

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CIC 4th 25 Aug 52 82-25240
Carney Smith 10006 29 Sept 52

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350 P B/OPS/OPS
HQ EUROPEAN COMMAND

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
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ROUTINE

TO : CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY FOR DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
FROM : HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND SGD HUEBNER
REF NO : S-3253 CITE: ECGID TOO: 071235Z

Reurad W-88995 dated 10 Sept 48. Further to ourad S-3106 dated 28 Sept 48. This division now in receipt of agent report re subject and will forward to you this date. If subjects story is correct he has possession of information of great value to this division. It is requested that if subject is to be sent to US that after guarantees of such action are given local Counter Intelligence agencies be allowed to exploit him prior to shipment.

W-83995 SMC IN 2043 10 SEP 48 DD/Int
S-3106 28 SEP 48 DD/Int



ORIGINATOR : DD/Int AUTHENTICATION: C
INFORMATION : AG RECORDS LT COL GSC

(b) (6)

09 OCT 48 0645Z KV/maw REF NO: S-3253 TOO: 071235Z

~~RESTRICTED~~

133

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE HANDLED AS CORRESPONDENCE OF LIKE CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT PARAPHRASE 5 per par 511 and 69a (4) AR 380-5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS

970th COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS Det.

UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of REGION III - (BAD-NAUHEIM)

~~60 days~~ by T.W.

on 19 AUG 1950 File No. III-D-1507.1

SUB-REGION DARMSTADT
APO 757

19 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Desertion of Russian Troops, Rumored

RE : Infiltration of Soviet Personnel into the American and British Zones of Occupation, Rumored.

1. The information contained in this report was supplied to the undersigned by P-41-III-D through O-31-III-D (Except where otherwise specified), on 15 March 1947.

2. The following rumors were observed to be in circulation among DARMSTADT (L50/M64) KPD personalities during the period from 6 March 1947 - 13 March 1947:

a. Russian troops in Germany are at the present time showing a tendency to desert and cross into the American and British zones of Occupation, dressed in civilian clothes, for the purpose of establishing residence there, thus avoiding redeployment to Russia. This tendency is the result of rumors among Soviet forces that all Russian military personnel stationed in Germany for a long period of time will be prevented from returning to their homes in Russia, probably by imprisonment in internment camps, to prevent pro-German propaganda from being disseminated by these returning soldiers in their home localities.

(NOTE:) O-33-III-D, who travelled to the LEIPZIG (N52/E21) fair on 10 March 1947 and remained in that city for three (3) days, also reported a tendency among Russian troops to desert, don civilian clothes, and attempt to remain in Germany, rather than be redeployed to Russia)

b. The borders of the Russian zone are presently heavily guarded, both by Russian troops and by German police.

c. A Russian officer, residing in DRESDEN (N52/E21), Angelikastrasse, is supposed to have remarked that Russia will strike ("Losschlagen") in May 1947, since the time will be most opportune then.

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- 1 -

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1997

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ON OCT 14 1997
BY USAMNSCOM FOURPA
Auth Part 4 102 DOD 5200.1R

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(Desertion of Russian Troops, Rumored - Cont'd)

3. Agent's comments, conclusions, and recommendations:

a. Evaluation: Paragraph #2a - B-F-6
#2b - B-F-6
#2c - B-F-6

APPROVED:

John M. Parish
JOHN M. PARISH
Special Agent, CIC
Commanding

Max M. Halley
MAX M. HALLEY
Special Agent, CIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

135

REFRAGED UNCLASSIFIED
ON OCT 14 1987
BY CDR USAINSCOM AFID
Auth Per 21033 DOD 5200.1-2
22155